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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The Great Recession and its aftermath deeply scarred the United 
States.  While estimates vary, approximately 9.3 million U.S. families 
lost their homes to foreclosure or short sales.1  In the aftermath of the 
                                                 
 1. See Jonathan Horn, Foreclosed?  Maybe You Can Buy Again, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB. (June 5, 2015, 9:41 AM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2015/jun/05/fore 
closure-shortsale-boomerang-buyers-real-estate/; Laura Kusisto, Many Who Lost Homes to 
Foreclosure in Last Decade Won’t Return—NAR, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 20, 2015, 12:50 
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/many-who-lost-homes-to-foreclosure-in-last-decade-wont-
return-nar-1429548640; see also Annamaria Andriotis et al., After Foreclosures, Home 
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financial collapse, nearly $11 trillion in household wealth vanished.2  
Years after the crisis, about 7.5 million families still owe more on their 
mortgage loans than the current value of their homes.3  Approximately 
7.9 million U.S. jobs disappeared,4 and the seasonally adjusted mean 
duration of unemployment nearly doubled the peak duration in prior 
modern economic downturns.5  These macroeconomic trends rippled 
out to profoundly damage the lives of millions of Americans.  The 
number of homeless families nationwide increased by 4% from 2008 
to 2009.6  Neighborhoods stricken by foreclosures faced significant 
increases in crime.7  Reflecting growing financial uncertainty and 
stress, sociologists found that the Great Recession was strongly 
associated with significant increases (a sixfold increase by one 
measure) in the likelihood that children would fall victim to physical 
abuse.8  Epidemiologists and economists have discovered an 
association between home mortgage foreclosure and significant 
increases in sickness, including heart attack, stroke, respiratory failure, 
gastrointestinal hemorrhage, and kidney failure.9  Studies suggest that 
                                                                                                             
Buyers Are Back, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 8, 2015, 8:17 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
after-foreclosures-home-buyers-are-back-1428538655 (providing alternative estimates); Tara 
Siegel Bernard, Years After the Market Collapse, Sidelined Borrowers Return, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/your-money/a-second-try-at-home-
buying-after-the-market-collapse.html (same). 
 2. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, at xv 
(2011). 
 3. See Michela Zonta & Sarah Edelman, The Uneven Housing Recovery, CTR. FOR 
AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/housing/report/2015/ 
11/02/123537/the-uneven-housing-recovery/; 7.3 Million Boomerang Buyers Poised To 
Recover Homeownership in Next 8 Years, REALTYTRAC (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.realty 
trac.com/news/foreclosure-trends/boomerang-buyers/. 
 4. Chris Isidore, 7.9 Million Jobs Lost, Many Forever, CNNMONEY (July 2, 2010, 
11:46 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/07/02/news/economy/jobs_gone_forever/. 
 5. Henry S. Farber, Job Loss in the Great Recession and Its Aftermath:  U.S. 
Evidence from the Displaced Workers Survey 3-4 (Nat’1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 21,216, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21216.pdf (“A related concern is the 
unprecedentedly long average duration of unemployment spells. . . .  The mean 
unemployment rate reached about 20 weeks in the three earlier recessions . . . but rose to 37 
weeks in the Great Recession.”). 
 6. M. William Sermons & Peter Witte, State of Homelessness in America, NAT’L 
ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS 1 (Jan. 2011), http://www.endhomelessness.org/page/-
/files/The_State_of_Homelessness_in_America_2011.pdf. 
 7. Lin Cui & Randall Walsh, Foreclosure, Vacancy and Crime, 87 J. URB. ECON. 72, 
80 (2015); Ryan M. Goodstein & Yan Y. Lee, Do Foreclosures Increase Crime? 3 (FDIC Ctr. 
for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 2010-05, 2010). 
 8. See, e.g., Jeanne Brooks-Gunn et al., The Great Recession and the Risk for Child 
Maltreatment, 37 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 721, 725 (2013). 
 9. Ana V. Diez Roux, Editorial, The Foreclosure Crisis and Cardiovascular Disease, 
129 CIRCULATION 2248, 2248-49 (2014); see also Mariana Arcaya et al., Effects of Proximate 
Foreclosed Properties on Individuals’ Systolic Blood Pressure in Massachusetts, 1987 to 
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the foreclosure crisis was partially responsible for a 13% increase in 
the national suicide rate10 and a 35% increase in the number of 
households facing food insecurity.11  The causes and consequences of 
the Great Recession are undeniably complex.  And although there are 
as many honorable and well-meaning people and companies in the 
consumer finance industry, there can be no serious debate that 
consumer financial services gone awry can intensely harm American 
families. 
 In the wake of this financial catastrophe, the public demanded, 
and the United States Congress delivered, the most transformative 
financial reform since the 1930s.  While the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act12 (Dodd-Frank) included many 
changes, its centerpiece was the creation of the new Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB or Bureau).13  The brainchild of the 
charismatic Harvard Law professor Elizabeth Warren,14 the newest 
federal agency describes itself as a “21st century agency that helps 
consumer finance markets work by making rules more effective, by 
                                                                                                             
2008, 129 CIRCULATION 2262, 2266 (2014) (“The presence of real estate-owned foreclosed 
properties near participants’ homes predicted higher measured systolic blood pressure in a 
large cohort.”); Carolyn C. Cannuscio et al., Housing Strain, Mortgage Foreclosure, and 
Health, 60 NURSING OUTLOOK 134 (2012) (finding that foreclosure has an adverse effect on 
mental health); Janet Currie & Erdal Tekin, Is There a Link Between Foreclosure and 
Health?, AM. ECON. J.:  ECON. POL’Y, Feb. 2015, at 63, 76-77 (finding statistically significant 
correlations between foreclosure and nonelective hospital visits for a variety of serious 
conditions). 
 10. Jason N. Houle & Michael T. Light, The Home Foreclosure Crisis and Rising 
Suicide Rates, 2005 to 2010, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1073, 1073 (2014). 
 11. Patricia M. Anderson et al., Food Insecurity and the Great Recession:  The Role 
of Unemployment Duration, Credit and Housing Markets 1 (June 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with Texas A&M University); see also Deborah A. Frank et al., Heat or 
Eat:  The Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program and Nutritional and Health Risks 
Among Children Less Than 3 Years of Age, 118 PEDIATRICS e1293 (2006), http://pediatrics. 
aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/118/5/e1293.full.pdf (evaluating the “association 
between a family's participation or nonparticipation in the Low Income Home Energy 
Assistance Program and the anthropometric status and health of their young children”); T. 
Jelleyman & N. Spencer, Research Report, Residential Mobility in Childhood and Health 
Outcomes:  A Systematic Review, 62 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 584 (2008) 
(describing the harmful effects of residential mobility on pediatric health); Margot B. Kushel 
et al., Housing Instability and Food Insecurity as Barriers to Health Care Among Low-
Income Americans, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 71 (2006) (showing the harmful effects of 
food insecurity on health). 
 12. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 22, 31, 42 
U.S.C. (2012)). 
 13. See id. tit. X, 124 Stat. at 1955-2113. 
 14. See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY J. (Summer 2007), 
http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/5/unsafe-at-any-rate/. 
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consistently and fairly enforcing those rules, and by empowering 
consumers to take more control over their economic lives.”15  The 
agency further describes its “core functions” thus: 
We work to give consumers the information they need to understand the 
terms of their agreements with financial companies.  We are working to 
make regulations and guidance as clear and streamlined as possible so 
providers of consumer financial products and services can follow the 
rules on their own. 
 Congress established the CFPB to protect consumers by carrying out 
federal consumer financial laws.  Among other things, we: 
• Write rules, supervise companies, and enforce federal consumer 
financial protection laws 
• Restrict unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices 
• Take consumer complaints 
• Promote financial education 
• Research consumer behavior 
• Monitor financial markets for new risks to consumers 
• Enforce laws that outlaw discrimination and other unfair treatment in 
consumer finance.16 
 Despite the agency’s seemingly benign mission statement and 
purpose, it has faced dogged, and at times vitriolic, opposition from 
some in the financial industry.  Some political leaders with close ties to 
the banking and consumer finance industry have argued that the CFPB 
(1) is a “runaway agency,”17 
(2) is an example of “how socialism starts” and “a vast 
bureaucracy with no congressional oversight,”18 
(3) is a “rogue agency that dishes out malicious financial 
policy,”19 
                                                 
 15. The Bureau, CFPB, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ (last visited 
Apr. 4, 2016) (“[T]his means ensuring that consumers get the information they need to make 
the financial decisions they believe are best for themselves and their families—that prices are 
clear up front, that risks are visible, and that nothing is buried in fine print.  In a market that 
works, consumers should be able to make direct comparisons among products and no 
provider should be able to use unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices.”). 
 16. Id.; see also Leonard J. Kennedy, Patricia A. McCoy & Ethan Bernstein, The 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau:  Financial Regulation for the Twenty-First Century, 
97 CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 1160-75 (2012) (providing case study examples of the Bureau’s 
approach to its core functions). 
 17. Michael Hiltzik, Consumer Protection:  Why Do Republicans Hate the CFPB So 
Much?, L.A. TIMES (July 23, 2015, 12:46 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-
mh-cfpb-republicans-20150723-column.html (quoting Senator Ted Cruz). 
 18. Louis Jacobson, Carly Fiorina Says Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Has 
‘No Congressional Oversight,’ POLITIFACT (Nov. 14, 2015, 8:33 PM), http://www.politifact. 
com/truth-o-meter/statements/2015/nov/14/carly-fiorina/carly-fiorina-says-consumer-financial-
protection-b/ (quoting Carly Fiorina). 
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(4) takes actions that are “misguided and deceptive,”20 
(5) “continually oversteps its bounds,”21 
(6) has aspects similar to “the Stalin model,”22 and 
(7) is a “nanny state mechanism.”23 
These claims have in turn provided rhetorical support for dozens of 
congressional bills aiming to eliminate, defund, or weaken the agency 
in some procedural or substantive respect.24 
                                                                                                             
 19. Ben Lane, U.S. Senator:  CFPB Is Rogue Agency Dishing Out Malicious 
Financial Policy, HOUSINGWIRE (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.housingwire.com/articles/ 
33322-us-senator-cfpb-is-a-rogue-agency-that-dishes-out-malicious-financial-policy (quoting 
Senator David Perdue). 
 20. REPUBLICAN STAFF OF H. COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., 114TH CONG., UNSAFE AT ANY 
BUREAUCRACY:  CFPB JUNK SCIENCE AND INDIRECT AUTO LENDING (2015). 
 21. John Ratcliffe, Abolishing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, WASH. 
TIMES (July 30, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/30/john-ratcliffe-
abolishing-the-consumer-financial-p/. 
 22. Jim Lardner, The Real Wolves of Wall Street, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 6, 
2015, 3:30 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/2015/10/06/the-
gops-obstructive-consumer-protection-play (quoting Representative Sean Duffy). 
 23. Ben S. Carson, The Perfect Example of Government Overreach:  The CFPB, 
WASH. TIMES (July 28, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/28/ben-
carson-perfect-example-government-overreach/. 
 24. At the end of 2015, at least forty-eight bills were pending before Congress that 
sought to change the CFPB.  These bills include the Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection Advisory Boards Act, H.R. 1195, 114th Cong. (2015) (requiring the creation of a 
Small Business Advisory Board “to advise and consult with the Bureau in the exercise of the 
Bureau’s functions under the Federal consumer financial laws applicable to eligible financial 
products or services” and “to provide information on emerging practices of small business 
concerns that provide eligible financial products or services, including regional trends, 
concerns, and other relevant information,” along with various requirements regarding board 
member qualifications and meeting frequency and limits on the amount of funding that the 
CFPB Director could request in future years); SAFE Act Confidentiality and Privilege 
Enhancement Act, H.R. 1480, 114th Cong. (2015) (amending the Secure and Fair Enforce-
ment for Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, div. A, tit. V, 122 Stat. 2654, 
2810-30, to allow federal and state officials to access any information that comes from any 
program or system run by the CFPB); Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection 
Accountability Act of 2015, H.R. 1261, 114th Cong. (2015) (prohibiting the CFPB from 
receiving funding from transfers of earnings from the Federal Reserve); Consumer Right to 
Financial Privacy Act of 2015, H.R. 1262, 114th Cong. (2015) (prohibiting the CFPB from 
disclosing a consumer’s personal information unless “the Bureau clearly and conspicuously 
discloses to the consumer, in writing or in an electronic form, what information will be 
requested, obtained, accessed, collected, used, retained, or disclosed” and “before such 
information is requested, obtained, accessed, collected, used, retained, or disclosed, the 
consumer informs the Bureau that such information may be requested, obtained, accessed, 
collected, used, retained, or disclosed”); Consumer Financial Protection Safety and Soundness 
Improvement Act of 2015, H.R. 1263, 114th Cong. (2015) (requiring the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council to set aside CFPB final regulations if it was determined that the 
regulations were “inconsistent with the safe and sound operations of United States financial 
institutions”); Financial Product Safety Commission Act of 2015, H.R. 1266, 114th Cong. 
(2015) (replacing the CFPB with a “Financial Product Safety Commission”); Reforming 
CFPB Indirect Auto Financing Guidance Act, H.R. 1737, 114th Cong. (2015) (creating 
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 A complete discussion of the merit of these claims or the pending 
legislation they purport to justify is well beyond the scope of this 
Article.  Instead, this study evaluates the actual track record of the 
CFPB in one important respect:  the congressional directive that the 
agency enforce the nation’s consumer financial protection laws.25  
Today, the CFPB’s Division of Supervision, Enforcement, and Fair 
Lending (SEFL) has been open for business for over four years.  The 
public has a right to expect that the CFPB has created an agency that 
will protect Americans from the all-too-real financial, mental health, 
and physical harms associated with illegal consumer financial 
practices.  To this end, this study gathers quantitative and qualitative 
information in hopes of providing an answer to a simple, but critically 
important, question:  Has the United States succeeded in creating an 
effective consumer financial civil law enforcement agency? 
 This Article presents the first empirical analysis of all publicly 
announced CFPB enforcement actions.  Part II provides a background 
discussion summarizing the CFPB’s enforcement authority, 
jurisdiction, and powers.  Part III explains the study’s simple, 
descriptive methodology.  Part IV reports results.  Part V sets out seven 
noteworthy findings, and Part VI briefly concludes.  To assist policy 
                                                                                                             
requirements for the CFPB to follow when issuing guidance regarding indirect auto 
financing, including public notice, consultation with other federal agencies, and studies on 
the potential effects that the guidance might have on certain consumer groups); Right To 
Lend Act of 2015, H.R. 1766, 114th Cong. (2015) (repealing section 704(b) of the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, tit. V, 88 Stat. 1500, 1521-25 (1974)—a statute 
through which the CFPB collects information about small business loans); Financial 
Institutions Examination Fairness and Reform Act, H.R. 1941, 114th Cong. (2015) 
(furthering protection of various institutions and credit unions from any potential retaliation 
by the CFPB); H.R. 2099, 114th Cong. (2015) (requiring the CFPB “to develop a model form 
for a disclosure notice that shall be used by depository institutions and credit unions”); 
Financial Transparency Act of 2015, H.R. 2477, 114th Cong. (2015) (requiring the CFPB to 
adopt new data-reporting standards); Community Financial Institution Exemption Act, H.R. 
3048, 114th Cong. (2015) (requiring the CFPB to exempt “community financial institutions,” 
or “insured depository institution[s] or credit union[s] with less than $10,000,000,000 in 
consolidated assets,” from CFPB rules and regulations); Bureau Research Transparency Act, 
H.R. 3131, 114th Cong. (2015) (requiring the CFPB “to include all studies, data, and other 
analyses” upon which a published research paper was based); S. 96, 114th Cong. (2015) 
(requiring the CFPB to disclose all of the information that the CFPB maintains about a 
particular consumer upon request by a consumer); SAFE Act Confidentiality and Privilege 
Enhancement Act, S. 372, 114th Cong. (2015) (allowing federal and state officials to have 
access to any information that comes from any program or system run by the CFPB); 
Financial Institutions Examination Fairness and Reform Act, S. 774, 114th Cong. (2015) 
(changing the appeals process that the CFPB must follow to further protect various 
institutions and credit unions from any potential retaliation by the CFPB); and Repeal CFPB 
Act, S. 1804, 114th Cong. (2015) (discontinuing the CFPB by repealing the Consumer 
Financial Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. X, 124 Stat. 1376, 1955-2113). 
 25. See 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a) (2012). 
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makers, courts, legal counsel, academics, and students studying the 
CFPB’s enforcement work, an appendix identifying every publicly 
announced CFPB enforcement action through 2015 follows. 
II. BACKGROUND:  THE CFPB’S SUPERVISORY AND 
ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY 
 U.S. federal consumer protection law is a jumble of statutes that 
Congress adopted and frequently amended in fits and starts over nearly 
fifty years.  Each statute was the product of compromise, and many 
were enacted in response to technological change or evolving 
commercial patterns in the sometimes harsh U.S. financial services 
industry.  Among the most important of these statutes are the Truth in 
Lending Act26 (TILA), the Equal Credit Opportunity Act27 (ECOA), the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act28 (FCRA), the Electronic Fund Transfer Act29 
(EFTA), the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 197430 
(RESPA), and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act31 (FDCPA).  
Congress has supplemented these core statutes with a variety of 
amendatory or specifically focused acts that address problematic 
practices in particular markets.  These statutes include the Home 
Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 199432 (HOEPA), the 
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act33 (ILSA), the Credit Card 
Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 200934 (CARD 
Act), the Military Lending Act35 (MLA), and the Secure and Fair 
                                                 
 26. Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, tit. I, 82 Stat. 146, 146-59 (1968) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. I). 
 27. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, tit. V, 88 Stat. 1500, 1521-25 
(1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. IV). 
 28. Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, tit. VI, 84 Stat. 1114, 1127-36 
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. III). 
 29. Electronic Fund Transfer Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. IX, 92 Stat. 3641, 3728-41 
(1978) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. VI). 
 30. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 27). 
 31. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. V). 
 32. Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, tit. I, 
subtit. B, 108 Stat. 2160, 2190-98 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. ch. 
41). 
 33. Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, tit. XIV, 82 Stat. 
476, 590-99 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 42). 
 34. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. ch. 41). 
 35. Military Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 670(a), 120 Stat. 2083, 2266-69 
(2006) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 987). 
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Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act of 200836 (SAFE Act).  In 
addition to each of these statutes, the Federal Trade Commission Act37 
(FTCA) has for many decades declared unlawful any “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”38 
 Prior to the financial crisis, regulatory, supervisory, and 
enforcement authority for each of these statues was distributed across a 
variety of regulatory agencies.  With some limited exceptions, the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) 
generally held regulatory authority under these statutes.39  The Federal 
Reserve also held supervisory and enforcement authority for these 
statutes with respect to bank holding companies, state-chartered banks 
that are members of the Federal Reserve System, nonbank subsidiaries 
of bank holding companies, and foreign banking organizations 
operating in the United States.40  For national banks that were not 
members of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (OCC) within the United States Department of the 
Treasury (Treasury) held supervisory and enforcement authority.41  The 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) held supervisory and 
enforcement authority for most of these statues with respect to state-
chartered banks.42  The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) 
                                                 
 36. Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-289, div. A, tit. V, 122 Stat. 2654, 2810-30 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 51). 
 37. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. ch. 2). 
 38. Id. § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). 
 39. Exceptions include the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, wherein Congress 
originally did not give rulemaking authority to any federal agency, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692, and 
the Military Lending Act, wherein Congress gave regulatory authority to the United States 
Department of Defense, see 10 U.S.C. § 987. 
 40. FED. RESERVE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM:  PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 59 
(9th ed. 2005).  The Federal Reserve also has jurisdiction over Edge Act Corporations, 
through which U.S. banks conduct international banking activities, and nonbanking activities 
of foreign banks.  Id.  Edge Act Corporations are bank subsidiaries set up to offer services 
only to non-U.S. residents and institutions.  See 12 C.F.R. pt. 211 (2015) (describing 
Regulation K); KAROL K. SPARKS & HARDING DE C. WILLIAMS, THE KEYS TO BANKING LAW:  
A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS 184 (2012). 
 41. See generally MARK JICKLING & EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R40249, WHO REGULATES WHOM?  AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. FINANCIAL SUPERVISION 4, 7 (2010) 
(describing the OCC’s regulatory power over banks and its incorporation into the Treasury).  
Prior to the financial crisis, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) held supervisory and 
enforcement authority over federally chartered thrifts.  Title III of Dodd-Frank abolished the 
OTS.  See 12 U.S.C. § 5413.  Dodd-Frank gave jurisdiction over savings and loan holding 
companies to the Federal Reserve.  See id. § 5412.  The OCC received rulemaking and 
supervisory authority over federal savings associations.  Id.  And Congress gave authority 
over state-chartered savings associations to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC).  Id. 
 42. See JICKLING & MURPHY, supra note 41, at 4, 14. 
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held supervisory and enforcement authority for these statutes for credit 
unions.43  The United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) was the primary regulatory and enforcement 
authority for RESPA.44  Financial companies other than banks and 
credit unions were not supervised by the federal government, but were 
subject to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforcement actions 
under most of these consumer protection statutes.45  The Federal 
Reserve, the OCC, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the FDIC, 
and the FTC each had authority to enforce the general prohibition of 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices against companies subject to their 
jurisdiction.46 
 Consumer advocates and academics argued that the structure of 
federal consumer financial regulation had several structural flaws.  The 
split responsibility for rulemaking, supervision, and enforcement 
across multiple different agencies with respect to interrelated statutes 
made timely reform and consistent interpretation difficult.  Many 
argued that prudential regulators tasked with both promoting safety 
and soundness as well as consumer protection compliance neglected 
the latter.47  Throughout the boom years of subprime and exotic 
mortgage lending prior to the 2008 crash, federal banking regulators 
often worked closely with the financial industry to preempt more 
aggressive state and local consumer protection regulations.48  The 
Federal Reserve declined to aggressively exercise its considerable 
discretion under HOEPA to address the emerging glut of unaffordable 
                                                 
 43. Id. at 4, 18. 
 44. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act § 2(a), 12 U.S.C. § 2601(a). 
 45. See JICKLING & MURPHY, supra note 41, at 4-5. 
 46. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1), (e)(1), (i)(2); FDIC & Fed. Reserve, Financial Institution 
Letters:  Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices by State-Chartered Banks, FDIC 1 (Mar. 11, 
2004), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2004/fil2604.html; OCC Advisory Letter:  
Guidance on Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, OCC (Mar. 22, 2002), http://www.occ. 
gov/static/news-issuances/memos-advisory-letters/2002/advisory-letter-2002-3.pdf. 
 47. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation:  Regulating Credit Markets 
Upstream, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 143, 155-56 (2009); Heidi Mandanis Schooner, The Role of 
Central Banks in Bank Supervision in the United States and the United Kingdom, 28 BROOK. 
J. INT’L L. 411, 427 (2003); cf. Erik F. Gerding, The Subprime Crisis and the Link Between 
Consumer Financial Protection and Systemic Risk, 5 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 93, 122 (2009) 
(arguing that effective safety and soundness regulation must include consumer protection). 
 48. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 2, at 13; Christopher L. Peterson, 
Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory Lending by Banking Agents:  Are Federal 
Regulators Biting Off More than They Can Chew?, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 515, 547-49 (2007); 
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s Authority and 
Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 225 (2004). 
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mortgage loans.49  Consumer finance businesses had considerable 
incentive to shop for the banking charter and regulator that provided 
the least searching oversight.50  HUD interpreted RESPA’s prohibition 
of kickbacks in a way that made it difficult for borrowers to legally 
challenge mortgage brokers that accepted “yield spread premium” 
compensation in exchange for convincing their clients to take on 
unaffordable, exotic mortgage loans.51  The FTC, which lacks juris-
diction over any bank or credit union, generally was unable to exert 
sufficient deterrence to head off the impending catastrophe.52  And the 
lack of supervisory oversight allowed nonbank financial companies 
more latitude in skirting the law. 
 In the wake of the financial crisis, Congress adopted Dodd-
Frank.53  Among a variety of reforms, Title X of Dodd-Frank, called 
the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 201054 (CFPA), created the 
new CFPB.  Drawing on the proposals of Warren, Oren Bar-Gill, Heidi 
Mandanis Schooner, and Treasury reports,55 the CFPA created the first 
                                                 
 49. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 2, at 19-22; KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & 
PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS:  RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND 
NEXT STEPS 194-96 (2011); see Susan Block-Lieb, Accountability and the Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 25, 34 (2012);  see also 15 
U.S.C. § 57a (authorizing the FTC to issue rules, policy statements, and definitions with 
respect to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce). 
 50. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 2, at xviii. 
 51. See Taiesha L. Cantwell, Yield-Spread Premiums:  Who’s Working for the 
Borrower?  HUD’s Erroneous Regulation and Its Bar on Plaintiffs, 21 LAW & INEQ. 367, 388-
90 (2003) (arguing that a legally permissible construction of RESPA’s kickback prohibition 
should not have precluded class actions based on rate-sheet pricing common to all 
borrowers).  Compare 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a) (prohibiting kickbacks in residential mortgage 
loan settlement), with Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act Statement of Policy 2001-1:  
Clarification of Statement of Policy 1999-1 Regarding Lender Payments to Mortgage 
Brokers, and Guidance Concerning Unearned Fees Under Section 8(b), 66 Fed. Reg. 53,052, 
53,053 (Oct. 18, 2001) (adopting a total-compensation test that permitted lender payment of 
fees to mortgage brokers in exchange for originating more expensive loans than borrowers 
qualified for under the lender’s own underwriting guidelines). 
 52. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 2, at 76. 
 53. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 22, 31, 42 
U.S.C.). 
 54. See id. tit. X, 124 Stat. at 1955-2113. 
 55. See Warren, supra note 14 (“[A] Financial Product Safety Commission could 
eliminate some of the most egregious tricks and traps in the credit industry.”); Oren Bar-Gill 
& Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 99 (2008) (calling for a new 
consumer financial administrative agency with “broad rulemaking and enforcement authority 
over consumer credit products [that would] eliminate regulatory gaps and contradictions . . . 
and . . . halt the state and federal regulatory competition that undercuts consumer safety”); 
Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Consuming Debt:  Structuring the Federal Response to Abuses in 
Consumer Credit, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 43, 83 (2005) (“True reform of consumer 
protection laws can only be achieved through an effective mechanism for implementation and 
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federal agency charged with an exclusive focus on consumer financial 
protection.56  The CFPA transferred regulatory authority for “consumer 
financial law” to the CFPB;57 it defined “consumer financial law” to 
include the CFPA itself along with eighteen “enumerated” consumer 
laws, including nearly all consumer credit and bank-account-related 
consumer protection statutes.58 
                                                                                                             
enforcement.  Giving the job of consumer protection to a consumer protection agency seems 
the most logical choice.  Asking bank regulators to do the job of a consumer protection 
agency not only poses conflicts of interest and creates inefficiencies, but could also distract 
bank regulators from their mandate:  to protect the solvency of banks.”); Financial Regulatory 
Reform:  A New Foundation, TREASURY 55 (June 17, 2009), https://www.treasury.gov/ 
initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf (“[W]e propose the creation of a single 
regulatory agency, a Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA), with the authority and 
accountability to make sure that consumer protection regulations are written fairly and 
enforced vigorously.”); Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure, TREASURY 
14 (Mar. 2008), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Blueprint. 
pdf (advocating for a “Conduct of Business Regulatory Agency” that “would be responsible 
for business conduct regulation, including consumer protection issues, across all types of 
firms, including the three types of federally chartered institutions”). 
 56. See Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 § 1021(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a). 
 57. See id.  There are at least two notable exceptions to the Bureau’s rulemaking 
authority.  First, in addition to the enumerated laws, Congress separately gave the CFPB, 
along with prudential regulators and the FTC, enforcement authority over the MLA in the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, §§ 661(a)-(b), 
662(a)-(b), 663, 126 Stat. 1632, 1785-86 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 987(d)(2), 
(f)(5)-(6), (h)(3), (i)(2)).  However, the Department of Defense retains rulemaking authority, 
subject to a consultation requirement with the CFPB, the Treasury, the prudential regulators, 
and the FTC.  Second, the Federal Reserve retained rulemaking authority over enumerated 
consumer laws as applied to automobile dealers that do not routinely engage in “buy here, 
pay here” financing.  See 12 U.S.C. § 5519. 
 58. The enumerated consumer laws include: 
• Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, tit. 
VIII, 96 Stat. 1469, 1545-48 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 39); 
• Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, 90 Stat. 257 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. I, pt. E); 
• Electronic Fund Transfer Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. IX, 92 Stat. 3641, 3728-41 
(1978) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. VI); 
• Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, tit. V, 88 Stat. 1500, 1521-25 
(1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. IV); 
• Fair Credit Billing Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, tit. III, 88 Stat. 1500, 1511-17 (1974) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. I, pt. D); 
• Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, tit. VI, 84 Stat. 1114, 1127-36 
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. III) (excluding sections 
615(e) and 628, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681m(e) and  1681w); 
• Homeowners Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-216, 112 Stat. 897 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 49); 
• Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. V); 
• Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 
102-242, § 151, 105 Stat. 2236, 2282-85 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1831t(c)-(f ) ); 
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 In addition to the creation of the CFPB, Dodd-Frank also 
included some substantive consumer financial law reform.  Most 
notably, Title XIV of Dodd-Frank included an array of changes to 
address predatory mortgage lending, including an ability-to-repay 
standard and a prohibition of loan originator compensation tied to 
terms other than the size of a loan.59  Dodd-Frank also amended EFTA 
to require more informative and accurate disclosures on remittance 
money transfers.60  And most controversially, Dodd-Frank also added a 
new general standard of “abusive practices” to the older deception and 
unfairness standards.61  Spelling out several different abusiveness 
criteria, the CFPA defines “abusive behavior” as an act or practice that 
(1) materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand 
a term or condition of a consumer financial product or service; or 
(2) takes unreasonable advantage of— 
(A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the 
material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service; 
                                                                                                             
• Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, §§ 502-509, 113 Stat. 1338, 
1437-45 (1999) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6802-6809) (excluding 
section 505 as it applies to section 501(b)); 
• Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-200, tit. III, 89 Stat. 
1124, 1125-28 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 29); 
• Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, tit. I, 
subtit. B, 108 Stat. 2160, 2190-98 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
15 U.S.C. ch. 41); 
• Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 27); 
• Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-289, div. A, tit. V, 122 Stat. 2654, 2810-30 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 
ch. 51); 
• Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, tit. I, 82 Stat. 146, 146-59 (1968) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. I); 
• Truth in Savings Act, Pub. L. No. 102-242, tit. II, subtit. F, 105 Stat. 2236, 2334-
43 (1991) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 44); 
• Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 111-8, § 626(a)-(b), 123 Stat. 524, 678-79 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5538); and 
• Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, tit. XIV, 82 Stat. 
476, 590-99 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 42). 
Also, Congress later gave the CFPB enforcement authority under the Military Lending Act, 
Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 670(a), 120 Stat. 2083, 2266-69 (2006) (codified as amended at 10 
U.S.C. § 987).  However, the Department of Defense retains rulemaking authority for this 
statute.  10 U.S.C. § 987(h). 
 59. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1403, 15 
U.S.C. § 1639b(c)(1); id. § 1411, 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(1). 
 60. See id. § 1073(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-1. 
 61. See id. § 1031(d), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d). 
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(B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the 
consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial 
product or service; or 
(C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered 
person to act in the interests of the consumer.62 
 The abusiveness standard has alternatively been the subject of 
much hand wringing in the financial services industry and excitement 
amongst consumer advocates.  Some have argued that the standard has 
the potential to tap the growing body of behavioral economic analysis 
of consumer contracts to prevent harmful practices not effectively 
addressed by the deceptive-and-unfair-practices prohibition of the 
FTCA and related laws.63  In contrast, some financial services industry 
lawyers have worried that, without further clarification, the standard is 
“infinitely flexible” and therefore meaningless.64  Similarly, Todd 
Zywicki has argued that that the standard is “dangerous” because it 
“will likely chill innovation,” especially in light of the CFPB’s 
“tendency toward overuse of enforcement.”65 
                                                 
 62. Id. 
 63. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Form and Substance in Consumer Financial Protection, 
7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 107, 107 (2012) (arguing that because the Bureau’s anti-
abuse authority is “based mostly on the substance of deals rather than disclosure, [it] is 
arguably the most exciting development in consumer protection since the advent of the 
modern consumer movement in the 1960s”); Tiffany S. Lee, No More Abuse:  The Dodd-
Frank and Consumer Financial Protection Act’s “Abusive” Standard, 14 J. CONSUMER & COM. 
L. 118, 119 (2011) (arguing that under the abusiveness standard, “the Bureau is empowered 
to take any authorized action, including rulemaking”); Dee Pridgen, Sea Changes in 
Consumer Financial Protection:  Stronger Agency and Stronger Laws, 13 WYO. L. REV. 405, 
413 (2013) (noting that the abusiveness standard “provides the CFPB with a unique and 
flexible authority to deal with abuses in the consumer financial services sector and to issue 
rules or initiate enforcement actions to address the exploitation of certain consumer 
behavioral biases by financial service providers”); Carey Alexander, Note, Abusive:  Dodd-
Frank Section 1031 and the Continuing Struggle To Protect Consumers, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
1105, 1144-45 (2011) (arguing that the Bureau’s “expansive power to address abusive 
practices . . . potentially represents the rising of a new dawn in consumer protection”). 
 64. See, e.g., Eric Mogilnicki & Eamonn K. Moran, The CFPB’s Enforcement of the 
Prohibition on Abusive Acts and Practices, 104 Banking Rep. (BNA) 236, 244 (Feb. 3, 2015) 
(“[W]e note the risk that the Bureau will continue to resist further defining the ‘abusive’ 
standard.  This approach would be a missed opportunity, as an infinitely flexible standard 
provides no guidance to covered persons and no permanent protection to consumers.”);  see 
also Reginald R. Goeke, Is the CFPB Torturing Language with Its Abusive Standard?, 
LAW360 (Feb. 12, 2015, 5:41 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/621386/is-the-cfpb-
torturing-language-with-its-abusive-standard (“This ‘I know it when I see it’ approach 
naturally grants the CFPB the maximum flexibility to bring enforcement actions, while 
granting industry participants the minimum level of notice about what is required of them.”). 
 65. Todd Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau:  Savior or Menace?, 
81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 922-23 (2013). 
 
 
 
 
2016] AN EMPIRICAL REVIEW 1071 
 
 Generally speaking, the CFPA applies to “covered persons,” 
which is defined as “any person that engages in offering or providing a 
consumer financial product or service.”66  At least with respect to 
nonbanks, the CFPA treats “any director, officer, or employee charged 
with managerial responsibility” as a “related person,” which is 
“deemed to mean a covered person for all purposes.”67  Beyond the 
CFPA’s general applicability, the CFPB’s authorities are tailored to fit 
each of the Bureau’s three primary legal tools.68 
 First, and most broadly, the CFPB generally has rulemaking 
authority under consumer financial laws, including the prohibition of 
unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices.69  Second, the Bureau 
has supervisory jurisdiction over all banks and credit unions with over 
$10 billion in assets.70  The Bureau also has supervisory jurisdiction 
over all nonbank mortgage originators, brokers, servicers, and 
foreclosure assistance providers; private student loan originators; and 
payday lenders.71  The CFPB also may assert supervisory jurisdiction 
over other large or especially risky nonbank covered persons by issuing 
a regulation.72  To date, the Bureau has issued “larger participant” rules 
creating supervisory jurisdiction over large consumer reporting 
agencies,73 consumer debt collection businesses,74 student loan 
servicers,75 international remittance providers,76 and automobile 
finance companies.77  Finally, the Bureau has enforcement jurisdiction 
over any covered person or service provider to a covered person, 
                                                 
 66. 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6)(A). 
 67. Id. § 5481(25)(B)-(C).  The definition of “related person” excludes bank holding 
companies, credit unions, and depository institutions.  Id. § 5481(25)(A). 
 68. In addition to its legal tools, the Bureau also has important authorities and 
responsibilities with respect to consumer education and engagement as well as consumer-
complaint intake and referral.  See, e.g., id. § 5534 (establishing consumer-complaint 
response authorities and responsibilities); id. § 5493(b)(2) (requiring the establishment of an 
office for providing information, guidance, and technical assistance on the provision of 
financial services to traditionally underserved communities); id. § 5493(d) (establishing an 
Office of Financial Education); id. § 5493(e) (establishing an Office of Service Member 
Affairs); id. § 5493(g) (establishing an Office of Financial Protection for Older Americans); 
id. § 5535 (requiring designation of a Private Education Loan Ombudsman). 
 69. Id. § 5512; 15 U.S.C. § 45. 
 70. 12 U.S.C. § 5515. 
 71. Id. § 5514(a). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See 12 C.F.R. § 1090.104 (2015). 
 74. See id. § 1090.105. 
 75. See id. § 1090.106. 
 76. See id. § 1090.107. 
 77. See Defining Larger Participants of the Automobile Financing Market and 
Defining Certain Automobile Leasing Activity as a Financial Product or Service, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 37,496 (June 30, 2015) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 1001, 1090). 
 
 
 
 
1072 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1057 
 
except for small banks and credit unions and automobile dealers that 
do not routinely engage in “buy here, pay here” financing.78  Other 
businesses Congress also generally excluded from the scope of the 
CFPB’s authority include persons regulated by the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the United States Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission, and state insurance regulators; real 
estate brokers; accountants; and attorneys practicing law under certain 
circumstances.79 
 Congress gave the CFPB’s Office of Enforcement the authority to 
initiate federal investigations through serving subpoenas, issuing civil 
investigative demands, or compelling testimony at investigative 
hearings.80  The Bureau’s investigative powers extend not only to 
covered persons, but also to anyone who Bureau investigators 
reasonably believe has evidence relevant to an investigation.81  To set 
limits upon and articulate expectations for Bureau investigations, the 
CFPB published a regulation defining its rules relating to 
investigations following a public notice-and-comment period.82 
 Congress authorized the Bureau to enforce federal consumer 
financial laws either through administrative enforcement procedures83 
or through its own authority to litigate in federal court.84  The former is 
governed by the CFPB’s regulation defining the rules of practice for 
adjudicative proceedings.85  This process is subject to the same rules of 
administrative procedure that govern other federal agencies.86  The 
rules provide for an adjudicative hearing on the Office of 
Enforcement’s alleged violations of law before an administrative law 
                                                 
 78. 12 U.S.C. § 5515(a), (c) (2012); id. § 5516(a), (d).  Unless they are acting as a 
service provider to a covered person, other businesses explicitly excluded from CFPB 
enforcement authority include nonfinancial retailers of goods or services, real estate brokers, 
manufactured home retailers, accountants or tax preparers, and, in some circumstances, 
attorneys.  Id. § 5517. 
 79. Id. §§ 5481(20)-(22); id. § 5517.  But see CFPB v. Frederick J. Hanna & Assocs., 
P.C., 114 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1362-70 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (holding that a debt collection “lawsuit 
mill” was subject to CFPB jurisdiction under FDCPA and CFPA). 
 80. See 12 U.S.C. § 5562. 
 81. See id. § 5562(b)(1), (c)(1). 
 82. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 1080. 
 83. See 12 U.S.C. § 5563. 
 84. See id. § 5564. 
 85. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 1081. 
 86. See id. § 1081.104(a) (“No provision of this part shall be construed to limit the 
powers of the hearing officers provided by the Administrative Procedure Act . . . .”); id. 
§ 1081.303(b)(1) (“Except as is otherwise set forth in this section, relevant, material, and 
reliable evidence that is not unduly repetitive is admissible to the fullest extent authorized by 
the Administrative Procedure Act . . . .”). 
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judge, called a “hearing officer.”87  Bureau administrative law judges 
are housed within an independent judicial office within the CFPB 
called the Office of Administrative Adjudication (OAA).88  OAA 
decisions are reviewable on appeal by the Director of the CFPB.89  
Alternatively, Congress has also authorized the Bureau’s Office of 
Enforcement to commence civil litigation in federal courts.90  This 
litigation authority is independent of the United States Department of 
Justice and merely requires the Bureau to notify the United States 
Attorney General when commencing a civil action.91 
 In either adjudicative proceedings or civil litigation, the CFPB is 
entitled by law to seek any appropriate legal or equitable relief, 
including rescission, refunds, restitution, disgorgement, damages, 
public notification of violations, and limits on the activities of the 
defendant.92  The Bureau can also seek to impose punitive civil money 
penalties not to exceed $5,000 per day during which the violation 
occurred, with the penalty increasing to up to $25,000 per day for 
defendants engaged in reckless violations and up to $1 million per day 
for knowing violations.93  In assessing civil money penalties, the 
CFPB, or a court, is required to consider the size and financial 
resources of the defendant, the gravity of the violation, the severity of 
risks or losses imposed on consumers, the history of previous 
violations, and other matters as justice requires.94 
III. METHODS:  CLASSIFYING THE CFPB OFFICE OF 
ENFORCEMENT’S BODY OF WORK 
 This study is the first empirical analysis of all publicly announced 
CFPB enforcement actions.  Every public enforcement case from the 
inception of the Bureau through the end of the 2015 calendar year was 
identified and classified.  CFPB enforcement actions can begin either 
as Office of Enforcement investigations or as supervisory exams.  This 
study does not include supervisory matters that were resolved 
confidentially.  On the other hand, where a supervisory exam led to a 
publicly announced enforcement action, the matter was included.  
Cases were identified through reviewing the Bureau’s press releases, 
                                                 
 87. Id. § 1081.103. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. §§ 1081.104, .302, .402. 
 90. See 12 U.S.C. § 5564(a) (2012). 
 91. Id. § 5564(d). 
 92. Id. § 5565(a)(2). 
 93. Id. § 5565(c)(2). 
 94. Id. § 5565(c)(3). 
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annual reports to Congress, and administrative adjudication docket, as 
well as searching the Bureau’s unsealed federal court pleadings.  CFPB 
press releases are widely available to anyone who registers with an 
email address for the Bureau’s press release distribution list and can 
also be retrieved through a search of the Bureau’s web page.  
Administrative cases were identified through the matter list and docket 
sheets maintained by the Bureau’s OAA.  The OAA’s matter list 
includes every case initiated by the Office of Enforcement through its 
administrative enforcement procedures.95 
 For every publicly announced case, the CFPB has released some 
legal documentation of the enforcement matter.96  Typically, these 
documents include one or more of the following:  a complaint, a notice 
of charges, a consent order, a stipulation consenting to the issuance of 
a consent order, or a settlement agreement.97  In addition, the Bureau 
ordinarily issues a press release, which is accompanied sometimes by a 
frequently-asked-questions document or another source of information 
for consumers who may be affected by the enforcement matter.  For 
cases pursued through the CFPB’s administrative enforcement 
procedures, the OAA maintains a docket sheet that includes all 
publicly available pleadings, motions, and orders.98  For cases in 
litigation, court filings were accessed as necessary through the publicly 
available PACER system provided by the U.S. judiciary. 
 For each of the CFPB’s cases, these documents were reviewed 
and coded using over 70 different variables.  Coded variables included 
the date the Bureau announced each case; the date the case was 
resolved (if any); whether the case was filed as an administrative 
enforcement matter with the OAA or as litigation in U.S. district court; 
whether the Bureau proceeded in partnership with some other law 
enforcement agency; whether the case was settled or contested upon 
announcement; whether the case involved a bank, credit union, or 
some other nondepository company; and whether the Bureau charged 
an individual defendant with violating the law. 
 Moreover, this study classifies every violation of law that the 
CFPB has asserted in public enforcement actions based on the statute 
                                                 
 95. See Enforcement Actions, CFPB, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-
compliance/enforcement/actions/ (last visited May 9, 2016). 
 96. See id. 
 97. See id. 
 98. See, e.g., PHH Corporation, PHH Mortgage Corporation, PHH Home Loans, 
LLC, Atrium Insurance Corporation, and Atrium Reinsurance Corporation, CFPB, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/enforcement/actions/phh-corporation/ 
(last updated July 31, 2015). 
 
 
 
 
2016] AN EMPIRICAL REVIEW 1075 
 
providing the legal authority for the claim.  These classifications 
include all 18 enumerated statues set out in the CFPA; additional law 
that Congress subsequently added to the Bureau’s enforcement 
jurisdiction; and the Bureau’s unfairness, deception, and abusive-acts-
or-practices (UDAAP) authority.99  UDAAP-related claims were 
further classified based on whether the Bureau alleged a violation of a 
deception- or unfairness-based regulation predating Dodd-Frank or the 
CFPA’s general statutory UDAAP prohibition.  Coded violations of 
deception- and unfairness-based regulations included the FTC’s 
Telemarketing Sales Rule,100 the Mortgage Advertising Practices 
Rule,101 and the Credit Practices Rule.102 
 This study also classified cases based on the type of financial 
product or service involved in the illegal activity.  These product or 
service classifications include the following categories:  credit cards, 
mortgage loans, student loans, automobile purchase loans, nonauto 
retail finance, deposit accounts, remittances, pawn credit, payday loans 
(including similar small installment loans and car title lending), 
medical debt, and payment processing services.103  Finally, the study 
also attempts to track the dollar amounts in total consumer redress and 
civil money penalties awarded in all consent orders, final 
administrative orders, or judgments imposed in every enforcement 
matter. 
 Simple descriptive statistics were derived from each of the over 
70 coded variables in order to evaluate the enforcement track record of 
the new agency.  All information included in this Article is a matter of 
public record and is available through nonconfidential, widely 
available sources.  The findings and analysis provided in this Article 
are the author’s estimates and opinions alone, and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the CFPB. 
                                                 
 99. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. 
 100. 16 C.F.R. pt. 310 (2015).  The Telemarketing Sales Rule implements the 
Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-297, 108 
Stat. 1545 (1994). 
 101. 12 C.F.R. pt. 1014.  The Mortgage Advertising Practices Rule (Regulation N) 
implements Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2009 § 626(a)-
(b), 15 U.S.C. § 5538 (2012), as amended by Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and 
Disclosure Act of 2009 § 511(a), 15 U.S.C. § 5538, and as amended by Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1097, 15 U.S.C § 5538. 
 102. 16 C.F.R. pt. 444. 
 103. The study also coded legal claims to identify whether the alleged illegal activity 
involved some form of debt collection practice and whether the case related to mortgage 
foreclosure activity. 
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IV. RESULTS 
 This Part presents 3 categories of results:  (1) results tracking the 
number of public cases and consumer relief awarded by year; 
(2) results illustrating the CFPB’s enforcement processes, including 
settlements, individual liability, administrative adjudication, and 
intergovernmental cooperation; and (3) results classified by financial 
institution, financial product or service, and consumer financial laws 
enforced. 
A. CFPB’s Enforcement Rollout:  Announced Cases and Consumer 
Relief Awarded by Year 
 The CFPB officially began its operations on July 21, 2011.104  
However, much of the early work of the agency focused on hiring 
within the complex federal process, securing physical facilities, 
acquiring technological systems, and writing office policies and 
procedures, as well as designing, drafting, and implementing federal 
regulations on investigative procedures and administrative 
adjudication.105  Moreover, the United States Senate did not confirm 
the Bureau’s first Director, Richard Cordray, for nearly 2 years, leading 
to some uncertainty in the Bureau’s early enforcement work.106 
 Nevertheless, the CFPB’s investigations and exams began to bear 
fruit in public law enforcement in 2012.  Figure 1 provides a graphic 
representation of the number of public enforcement cases announced 
by the CFPB, juxtaposed with the number of CFPB employees by year.  
In 2012, the Bureau announced 8 public enforcement actions.  By the 
time the Senate confirmed Director Cordray on July 16, 2013,107 the 
Bureau had announced 17 public enforcement cases, including 6 
against large banks and 11 against nonbank financial companies. In 
the calendar year 2013, the Bureau announced 27 actions.  In 2014 and 
2015, the Bureau announced 32 and 55 actions, respectively.  Over the 
                                                 
 104. Press Release, CFPB, CFPB Ready To Help Consumers on Day One (July 21, 
2011), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-
ready-to-help-consumers-on-day-one/. 
 105. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 1080. 
 106. Block-Lieb, supra note 49, at 42; see Deepak Gupta, Recent Development, The 
Consumer Protection Bureau and the Constitution, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 945, 946 & n.1 (2013); 
Michael J. Teter, Letting Congress Vote:  Judicial Review of Arbitrary Legislative Inaction, 87 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1435, 1449-50 (2014). 
 107. Danielle Douglas, Senate Confirms Cordray To Head Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, WASH. POST (July 16, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ 
economy/senate-confirms-consumer-watchdog-nominee-richard-cordray/2013/07/16/965d82 
c2-ee2b-11e2-a1f9-ea873b7e0424_story.html. 
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first 4 years of the Bureau’s active enforcement program, the number 
of public enforcement actions has roughly tracked the Bureau’s 
recruitment of staff. 
 
 Figure 2 provides the total consumer relief awarded to consumers 
in public enforcement actions over the first 4 years of the CFPB’s 
active law enforcement program.  Figure 2’s left y-axis and bar chart 
numbers for total consumer relief include consumer redress, refunds, 
and canceled debts awarded to consumers in millions of dollars.  In the 
first year of the CFPB’s active enforcement program, the Bureau’s 8 
announced enforcement cases ordered financial service providers to 
refund or forgive approximately $425 million on behalf of U.S. 
consumers.  In 2013, the Bureau’s 27 cases provided $536 million in 
consumer relief.  In 2014 and 2015, the Bureau’s enforcement program 
began to hit its stride, facilitated by a confirmed Director, well-
developed operating systems, and a staff nearing capacity.  In 2014, the 
Bureau announced 32 cases, which together produced $3.8 billion in 
consumer relief.  And the 55 public enforcement actions the Bureau 
announced in 2015 awarded $6.4 billion in relief to consumers. 
 The right y-axis and plotted line within Figure 2 divides the total 
consumer relief figure for each year by the number of employees 
within the Bureau’s SEFL division at that time.  SEFL employees share 
responsibility for exams and investigations that that lead to public 
enforcement actions when appropriate.108  The CFPB reports that 45% 
                                                 
 108. Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau:  Fiscal Year 2015, 
CFPB 8 (Nov. 16, 2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201511_cfpb_report_fiscal-year-
2015.pdf.  Although this study only tracks publicly announced enforcement actions, these 
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of its total workforce is housed within SEFL.109  Thus, including every 
attorney, examiner, manager, and all support staff, the approximately 
437 SEFL employees in 2012 produced nearly $1 million in awarded 
redress, refunds, and cancelled debts for U.S. consumers per employee.  
By 2015, SEFL had added approximately 250 employees.110  Neverthe-
less, the productivity of each employee, as measured in consumer 
relief, grew nearly tenfold.  In 2015, CFPB employees charged with 
enforcing consumer financial protection laws won almost $10 million 
in relief for U.S. consumers per employee. 
 
                                                                                                             
cases reflect the efforts of supervisory exams that uncovered violations referred to the Office 
of Enforcement. 
 109. Id. at 13. 
 110. Compare id. (showing employment as of 2015), with Financial Report of the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau:  Fiscal Year 2014, CFPB 11-12 (2014), http://files. 
consumerfinance.gov/f/201411_cfpb_report_fiscal-year-2014.pdf (showing the growth in 
employees). 
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B. CFPB’s Enforcement Process:  Settlement, Individual Liability, 
Administrative Adjudication, and Interagency Collaboration 
 Analysis of the CFPB’s publicly announced enforcement actions 
yields some insights into the Bureau’s enforcement process.  Figure 3 
presents data on the number of the Bureau’s enforcement actions that 
were either contested or settled by the defendant at the time the Bureau 
publicly announced the case.  Much of the Bureau’s supervisory and 
enforcement work takes place in the form of confidential exams and 
investigations.111  Much of the Bureau’s law enforcement work is not 
publicly announced.  Nevertheless, public enforcement actions are 
especially important because they can provide a window into the most 
substantial or troubling illegal activity uncovered by the CFPB.  Figure 
3 classifies a case as “contested” for purposes of this study when the 
Bureau had not reached a settlement with all of the defendants in the 
case at the time the Bureau publicly announced the case.  Contested 
cases include cases in which the defendant was unable or unwilling to 
settle on terms that the Bureau found acceptable, as well as a handful 
of cases in which the Bureau sought an ex parte temporary restraining 
order from a federal judge prior to public announcement in order to 
prevent the defendant from concealing illegally obtained assets. 
 
                                                 
 111. See CFPB Supervision and Examination Manual (Version 2), CFPB (Oct. 1, 
2012), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_cfpb_supervision-and-examination-manual-v2.pdf. 
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 Overall, a relatively small proportion of defendants have been 
unable or unwilling to settle CFPB enforcement actions on terms that 
the Bureau would accept.  In the first year of the Bureau’s enforcement 
work, only 2 matters included defendants who publicly contested the 
Bureau’s case.  Six and 11 public enforcement cases included at least 
one contesting defendant in 2013 and 2014, respectively.  Although the 
total number of announced CFPB cases increased substantially in 
2015, the number of cases with defendants who were unable or 
unwilling to settle on terms acceptable to the Bureau actually declined 
slightly, to 10.  Altogether, only 29 cases included a defendant who 
contested a public Bureau enforcement action over the course of the 
Bureau’s existence, constituting about 23.8% of announced cases. 
 Table 1 breaks down the total number and percent of both settled 
and contested public enforcement actions based on whether each case 
charged an individual defendant with violating the law.  The Bureau 
has, on average, charged one or more individuals in nearly a third of its 
public enforcement cases.  Approximately 16.4% of the Bureau’s cases 
charged an individual who contested after public announcement.  
About 14% of the Bureau’s cases charged an individual and settled 
upon announcement.  The largest group of cases in this respect, about 
62% of all public matters, were settled cases in which the Bureau did 
not charge an individual.  Although the number of individuals charged 
in contested and settled cases is comparable (17 and 20, respectively), 
the proportion of cases that charged individuals is much higher among 
contested cases.  Thus, the CFPB charged individuals in 20 out of 29 
contested cases, versus 17 out of 93 settled cases.  Predictably, this 
suggests that defendants may be less likely to accept settlement offers 
when the Bureau is determined to require that individuals pay some 
portion of restitution, disgorgement, or penalties for illegal activity out 
of their own pockets. 
Table 1. Settlement of Public CFPB Enforcement Actions in Cases Where Individuals 
Were and Were Not Charged with Illegal Activity 
Contested cases Settled cases Total 
n % n % n % 
Individual(s) charged 20 16.4 17 13.9 37 30.3 
No individual(s) charged 9 7.4 76 62.3 85 69.7 
Total 29 23.8 93 76.2 122 100.0 
Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 2012-2015  
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 Table 2 further classifies settlement data based on what 
adjudicative process the Bureau used to enforce the law.  The Bureau 
has the authority and discretion to bring enforcement actions either in 
U.S. district court or through an administrative enforcement action 
before an administrative law judge.112  Table 2 shows the number and 
percent of cases that the Bureau filed in federal court versus those 
filed in the CFPB’s OAA.  These data show that the Bureau has 
actively used both of its enforcement procedural vehicles, with about 
45% of the public cases filed in federal court and 55% of the public 
cases filed with the OAA.  However, among cases the Bureau could 
not settle, federal court was a much more likely venue.  In 26 of 29 
contested cases, the Bureau chose to litigate in federal court.  In the 
history of the Bureau, it has only brought contested public 
enforcement cases as administrative enforcement actions 3 times, 
which constitutes about 2% of all public matters.113 
Table 2. Settlement of Public CFPB Enforcement Actions: U.S. District Courts and CFPB 
Administrative Adjudication, 2012-2015 
Contested cases Settled cases Total 
U.S. 
district 
courts 
n 26 29 55 
% of all cases 21% 24% 45% 
Consumer relief $575,076,534 $2,921,329,458 $3,496,405,991 
Disgorgement $ - $ - $ - 
Civ. money penalties $15,232,079 $77,559,001 $92,791,080 
CFPB 
admin. 
process 
n 3 64 67 
% of all cases 2% 52% 55% 
Consumer relief $49,999 $7,739,677,062 $7,739,727,061 
Disgorgement $109,188,618 $166,421 $109,355,039 
Civ. money penalties $1 $294,479,001 $294,479,002 
Both 
court 
and 
admin. 
cases 
n 29 93 122 
% of all cases 24% 76% 100% 
Consumer relief $575,126,533 $10,661,006,519 $11,236,133,052 
Disgorgement $109,188,618 $166,421 $109,355,039 
Civ. money penalties $15,232,080 $372,038,002 $387,270,082 
Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 2012-2015  
 Table 2 also includes data on the dollar amounts awarded in 
consumer relief, disgorgement, and civil money penalties.  These 
dollar amounts include only those cases where a federal judge or 
                                                 
 112. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. 
 113. These cases were In re Integrity Advance, LLC, CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0029 
(filed Nov. 18, 2015) (alleging TILA, EFTA, and UDAAP violations); In re PHH Corp., 
CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0002 (filed Jan. 29, 2014) (alleging RESPA kickback violations); and 
In re 3D Resorts-Bluegrass, LLC, CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0002 (Dec. 2, 2013) (alleging 
ILSA violations). 
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administrative law judge issued a final order before December 31, 
2015.  Therefore, these numbers conservatively understate the likely 
future awards that may be produced in currently disputed litigation.  
With that caveat, the Bureau’s public enforcement actions pursued 
through its administrative process produced a total of about $7.7 
billion in consumer relief provided to U.S. consumers, which is just 
over twice the $3.5 billion in consumer relief awarded through final 
orders issued by U.S. district court judges.  Looking only at contested 
cases, however, the consumer relief awarded by federal district court 
judges—$575 million—dwarfs the approximately $50,000 in 
consumer relief awarded by administrative law judges in the Bureau’s 
3 contested administrative enforcement actions. 
 Also of interest in Table 2 are data showing the proportion of 
consumer relief, disgorgement, and civil money penalties awarded in 
contested versus settled cases.  The vast majority of consumer relief 
awarded to consumers came in cases where the defendant agreed to 
provide the remedy.  Nearly $10.7 billion in consumer relief came out 
of settled cases, as opposed to $575 million in contested cases.  
Similarly, the overwhelming majority of civil money penalties, $372 
million, were agreed to by defendants in settlements.  In contrast, the 
Bureau’s public enforcement actions generated $15 million in penalties 
in the 24% of its cases that defendants contested after announcement. 
 Director Cordray has often spoke publicly about the CFPB’s 
commitment to working collaboratively with other federal and state 
regulatory and law enforcement agencies.114  The Bureau’s 4 years of 
public enforcement now permits some evaluation of the Bureau’s track 
record in its efforts to build cooperative bridges to other agencies.  
While it is difficult to assess the qualitative nature of collaborative 
relationships, Table 3 provides some information that reflects a 
willingness to work with states, Native American tribal governments, 
and other federal agencies.  In 41 of the Bureau’s 122 public 
enforcement actions, the Bureau has publicly cited some form of 
cooperation with another government agency.  In some cases, this 
collaboration took the form of jointly filed pleadings.115  In other 
matters, the Bureau cited collaboration in laying the groundwork for 
                                                 
 114. See, e.g., Richard Cordray, Dir., CFPB, Prepared Remarks at the National 
Association of Attorneys General (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/news 
room/prepared-remarks-of-cfpb-director-richard-cordray-at-the-national-association-of-
attorneys-general/. 
 115. See, e.g., Complaint, CFPB v. S/W Tax Loans, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-00299-JB-WPL 
(D.N.M. Apr. 16, 2015) (jointly filed complaint with the Navajo Nation Department of 
Justice). 
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the enforcement action, through the provision of expertise or 
information sharing, for example.116  Some collaborative cases involved 
both federal and state partners, such as the debt-collection-practices 
action against JPMorgan Chase Bank, which the Bureau pursued in 
partnership with the attorneys general of 47 states, the District of 
Columbia, and the OCC.117  Most of the Bureau’s large cases, as 
measured by total consumer relief awarded, have necessitated some 
form of interagency collaboration.  Cases in which the Bureau publicly 
cited some form of cooperation or partnership with another agency 
produced about $10.7 billion in consumer relief, constituting nearly 
95% of the total relief awarded in all CFPB public enforcement 
actions. 
Table 3. CFPB Enforcement Actions with Publicly Announced Interagency 
Collaboration, 2012-2015 
Partner Cases Contested cases 
Cases w/ 
indvd. 
charged 
Consumer relief 
n % $ x 1000 % 
Federal agency(ies)a 21 17.2 3 1 3,254,850.0 29.0 
State agency(ies)b 13 10.7 3 9 2,231,001.4 19.9 
Both fed. and state 6 4.9 1 1 5,175,655.7 46.1 
Tribal agencyc 1 0.8 0 1 438.0 0.0 
Total 41 33.6 7 12 10,661,945.2 94.9 
a This includes the United States Department of Education, the Department of Justice, the Federal 
Communications Commission, the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, the FTC, HUD, and the OCC.  
 
b This includes agencies from 49 state governments and the District of Columbia.  
 
c Navajo Nation Department of Justice 
Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 2012-2015 
C. CFPB’s Enforcement Outcomes:  Financial Products, Consumer 
Financial Laws, and Financial Institutions 
 Analysis of the CFPB’s publicly announced enforcement actions 
yields some insights into the types of companies and financial 
                                                 
 116. See, e.g., Press Release, CFPB, CFPB Takes Action To Obtain $120 Million in 
Redress from Sprint and Verizon for Illegal Mobile Cramming (May 12, 2015), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-to-obtain-120-million-in-
redress-from-sprint-and-verizon-for-illegal-mobile-cramming/ (citing consultation with the 
Federal Communications Commission and the office staff of state attorneys general). 
 117. See, e.g., CFPB v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 1:15-cv-00179-RDB (D. Md. 
Feb. 4, 2015). 
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products that have been subject to CFPB enforcement actions.  Figure 
4 breaks down the number of CFPB enforcement actions per year 
based on whether the CFPB brought each case against banks or 
nonbanks.  Figure 4 should be interpreted bearing in mind the CFPB’s 
enforcement jurisdiction.  Dodd-Frank gave the CFPB enforcement 
jurisdiction only over the United States’ largest banks and credit 
unions—those with total assets exceeding $10 billion.118  This means 
that medium- and small-sized banks and credit unions are not subject 
to CFPB enforcement investigations or exams.  In contrast, the 
Bureau’s enforcement jurisdiction over nonbanks is not limited by the 
size or assets of the company.119  A majority of the Bureau’s early cases 
in 2012 were against large banks.  In 2013, half of the Bureau’s 27 
cases were against large banks.  This proportion declined in 2014 and 
eventually stabilized in 2015 at about a 25% of all matters.  Over its 
first 4 years, the Bureau has brought 30 cases against large banks, 
accounting for about 25% of the total number of public cases.120 
 
                                                 
 118. See 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (2012). 
 119. Id. § 5514. 
 120. A handful of credit unions do exceed the $10 billion threshold.  However, the 
Bureau did not announce any public enforcement actions against credit unions. 
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 Table 4 contrasts with Figure 4 by presenting total consumer 
relief and civil money penalties awarded in cases against large banks 
versus cases against nonbanks, both by year and overall.  Using 2013 
as an example, in that year, the Bureau filed a third of its cases against 
banks, but perhaps reflecting the large size of these institutions, 
consumer relief awarded in these matters accounted for about 90% of 
all consumer relief.  In contrast, the $2.8 billion in relief awarded 
against nonbanks accounted for 72% of all consumer relief awarded in 
2014.121  In 2015, the number of bank cases doubled, and bank matters 
produced about 80% of consumer relief.  Overall, while facing about a 
quarter of the public enforcement cases, large banks paid about 65% of 
consumer relief and 63% of civil money penalties. 
Table 4. Consumer Relief and Civil Money Penalties in Public CFPB Enforcement Cases Against 
Banks and Nonbanks by Year, 2012-2015 
Consumer relief CMPs 
$ % $ % 
2012 
Banks 425,000,000  100.0 46,100,000  100.0 
Nonbanks 100,000  0.0 5,000  0.0 
Total 425,100,000  100.0 46,105,000  100.0 
2013 
Banks 485,800,000  90.6 47,634,000  63.5 
Nonbanks 50,539,465  9.4 27,366,002  36.5 
Total 536,339,465  100.0 75,000,002  100.0 
2014 
Banks 1,065,300,000  27.7 38,700,000  62.0 
Nonbanks 2,784,071,234  72.3 23,736,076  38.0 
Total 3,849,371,234  100.0 62,436,076  100.0 
2015 
Banks 5,385,059,808  83.8 109,500,000  53.7 
Nonbanks 1,040,262,545  16.2 94,229,004  46.3 
Total 6,425,322,353  100.0 203,729,004  100.0 
Total 
Banks 7,361,159,808  65.5 241,934,000  62.5 
Nonbanks 3,874,973,244  34.5 145,336,082  37.5 
Total 11,236,133,052  100.0 387,270,082  100.0 
Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 2012-2015  
 Table 5 classifies enforcement actions by selected financial 
product or service.  Several caveats are in order.  First, not every 
enforcement action is included within this selected list of financial 
products or services.  And, second, some enforcement actions involve 
multiple classifications.  Thus, for example, an enforcement action 
against a bank for deceptively marketing an ancillary “add on” 
insurance product in a credit card program is included in the numbers 
                                                 
 121. Much of the nonbank consumer relief generated in 2014 came from the CFPB’s 
mortgage servicing joint action with state attorneys general against Ocwen Financial 
Corporation and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC.  See CFPB v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 1:13-cv-
02025-RMC (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2014) (ordering the defendant to provide more than $2 billion 
in relief to consumers). 
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for both ancillary products and credit cards.122  Similarly, where a case 
addresses illegal debt collection practices associated with a home 
mortgage loan, the case is included within the figures for both 
classifications.  Table 5 also includes the number of cases within each 
product or service category in which one or more defendants contested 
the Bureau’s charges following public announcement.  The percent-
contested figure in Table 5 refers to the percent of contested cases 
within that product or service category, rather than the percentage of 
all cases contested. 
 With 47 cases overall, home mortgage loans were the financial 
service subject to the greatest number of CFPB enforcement actions, 
constituting almost 4 out of every 10 public matters.  Mortgage-
lending-related cases generated about $2.9 billion in consumer relief, 
which accounted for about 25% of the relief awarded to consumers 
overall.  Mortgage lending defendants publicly contested the Bureau’s 
charges in about a quarter of the Bureau’s mortgage-lending-related 
caseload.  The Bureau charged individual defendants in 14 of 47 
mortgage lending cases.  Thus, cases with individual defendants 
accounted for about 30% of the Bureau’s public mortgage lending 
docket, which tracked the Bureau’s individual charging patterns 
overall.123 
 The second most prevalent type of case was matters challenging 
debt collection practices.  Through 2015, the Bureau announced 29 
cases alleging illegal debt collection practices, which produced $6.7 
billion in consumer relief.  Almost 60% of the relief awarded to U.S. 
consumers occurred in cases alleging illegal debt collection practices.  
Twenty percent of the Bureau’s contested cases involved debt 
collection practices. 
 The third most prevalent type of public enforcement action was 
cases addressing illegal credit card practices.  The Bureau’s 21 public 
credit card cases produced more consumer relief than cases in any 
other product category—almost $7.1 billion.124  Although the CFPB 
                                                 
 122. Correspondingly, the dollar amounts for consumer relief and civil money 
penalties reflect the awards generated in cases that addressed illegal activity in each of the 
listed product or service classifications.  Concerning a case that involves multiple product or 
service classifications, Table 4 attributes dollar amounts of relief and penalties for the same 
case in both categories.  For total relief awarded, see discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 123. See supra Table 1. 
 124. There is significant overlap between debt collection and credit card cases because 
several matters involved collection of credit card debts.  See, e.g., In re Chase Bank, USA 
N.A., CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0013 (July 8, 2015) (settling allegations that Chase Bank 
unfairly and deceptively sold erroneous and unenforceable credit card receivables to debt 
buyers). 
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brought less than half as many credit card cases as mortgage loan 
cases, credit card matters led to more than double the consumer relief 
produced by mortgage matters.  However, credit card related cases 
were particularly unlikely to involve individually charged 
defendants—an individual was charged in only one case involving 
credit card debt settlement services.125  And defendants in credit card 
cases publicly contested the Bureau’s claims at less than half the 
Bureau’s overall contested rate.126 
 The CFPB has announced 13 cases against companies providing 
debt relief or settlement services to consumers, accounting for about 
10% of the overall number of public enforcement actions.  Debt 
settlement providers publicly contested the Bureau’s claims in just over 
60% of debt relief cases, making this group more likely than any other 
to refuse the Bureau’s settlement offers.  Although debt settlement 
cases make up about 10% of the overall number of public enforcement 
actions, they account for about 27.5% of the Bureau’s publicly 
contested cases.  Debt settlement matters led to about $19 million in 
total consumer relief.  However, debt settlement providers faced 
relatively steep civil money penalties in comparison to the overall 
amount of consumer relief awarded.  With about $13.8 million in 
penalties, debt relief services had the highest penalty-to-relief ratio—
69.4%—of any financial product or service category.  Similarly, 
although consumer relief awarded in debt settlement cases amounted 
to only about 0.2% of the consumer relief awarded in all the Bureau’s 
public cases, the civil money penalties awarded in debt settlement 
cases accounted for 3.5% of all awarded penalties.  The Bureau’s debt 
settlement cases are also notable in that the Bureau charged at least one 
individual in every publicly announced case, which is unique to debt 
settlement cases. 
 On balance, the Bureau’s early public enforcement leaned toward 
mainstream financial products commonly, but by no means 
exclusively, offered to middle- and upper-middle-class consumers.  For 
example, although the Bureau has announced 47 mortgage lending 
cases and 21 credit card matters, it has not announced any public 
actions against either pawnbrokers or remittance providers.  The 
                                                 
 125. See Complaint at 6, CFPB v. Premier Consulting Grp. LLC, No. 1:13-cv-03064-
JLC (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2014) (charging the owner of a debt settlement provider individually 
for directing employees to promise deceptively to consumers that the provider would settle 
unsecured credit card balances for 55% of the total outstanding obligations). 
 126. See supra Table 1 (noting that 23.8% of all CFPB enforcement actions were 
contested upon public announcement). 
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Bureau has announced 12 cases against payday and installment 
lenders.  However, consumer advocates are likely to view the Bureau’s 
total consumer relief of $71 million in this large and controversial 
market as a relatively modest success in light of the supermajority of 
Americans who would prefer to adopt traditional usury limits that 
would effectively prohibit most payday lending altogether.127  
Reasonable observers might also query whether the CFPB has 
marshalled sufficient resources in the large and troublesome student 
lending market.  Nevertheless, effective supervision and enforcement 
in mortgage and credit card markets are surely reasonable objectives 
for the Bureau, given the history of the foreclosure crisis, the scale of 
these markets, and the ability to provide cost-effective relief to large 
numbers of Americans. 
  
                                                 
 127. Timothy E. Goldsmith & Nathalie Martin, Interest Rate Caps, State Legislation, 
and Public Opinion:  Does the Law Reflect the Public’s Desires?, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 115, 
120-22, 127 (2014) (collecting extensive polling data and results of ballot measures and 
presenting original survey results). 
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Table 5. Public CFPB Enforcement Actions Relating to Selected Financial Product or 
Service Markets, 2012-2015
Financial 
product or 
Service 
Cases Contested 
cases 
Individ. charged 
Consumer reliefa CMPsa 
n % n % $ x 1000 % $ x 1000 % 
Mortgages 47 38.5 11 23.4 14 2,913,637.2 25.9 99,477.0 25.7 
Debt 
collection 29 23.8 6 20.7 6 6,715,728.8 59.8 155,200.0 40.1 
Credit 
cards 21 17.2 2 9.5 1 7,089,981.0 63.1 173,120.0 44.7 
Ancillary 
products 16 13.1 0 0.0 0 2,425,061.0 21.6 128,750.0 33.2 
Debt relief 
services 13 10.7 8 61.5 13 19,412.0 0.2 13,471.0 3.5 
Payday/ 
installment 12 9.8 5 41.7 7 71,150.9 0.6 17,693.0 4.6 
Auto 
finance 10 8.2 1 10.0 0 172,612.9 1.5 39,465.0 10.2 
Payment 
processing 7 5.7 2 28.6 3 144,164.1 1.3 12,376.0 3.2 
Student 
loans 6 4.9 3 50.0 2 501,200.0 4.5 2,525.0 0.7 
Retail 
finance 4 3.3 0 0.0 2 95,579.1 0.9 150.0 0.0 
Deposit 
accounts 3 2.5 0 0.0 0 62,900.0 0.6 15,200.0 3.9 
Pawn 
loans 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 .0 0.0 .0 0.0 
Remittances 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 .0 0.0 .0 0.0 
aAttributes awarded consumer relief and civil money penalties to multiple product or service 
classifications for cases relating to more than one type of product or service.
Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 2012-2015 
 A close reading of the Bureau’s complaints, notices of charges, 
consent orders, and other publicly released documents permits 
assessment of the Bureau’s track record in enforcing various 
enumerated consumer financial laws under its jurisdiction.  Table 6 
provides descriptive statistics gathered from the Bureau’s public cases 
that pleaded or settled claims under 6 core enumerated statutes:  TILA, 
FCRA, ECOA, FDCPA, EFTA, and RESPA. 
 The Bureau pleaded RESPA violations in 21 cases—more than 
any other enumerated statute.  The next most prevalent were cases 
pleading TILA and FCRA claims, with 18 and 14 public actions, 
respectively.  Table 6 also shows which enumerated statute violations 
were alleged against banks versus nonbanks.  Notably, 10 of the 
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Bureau’s 11 cases that alleged FDCPA violations were against 
nonbanks.  But 6 of the Bureau’s 8 fair lending cases brought under 
ECOA were against banks. 
 The consumer relief and civil money penalty figures in Table 6 
should be interpreted cautiously because these figures represent the 
total amounts awarded in cases that included an alleged violation of 
each respective enumerated statute.  In analyzing cases with violations 
of multiple statutes, it is generally not feasible to distinguish what 
portion of the overall relief or penalty is attributable to each count.  By 
way of example, Table 6 shows that the 18 cases that alleged a 
violation of TILA produced total consumer relief of approximately 
$307 million.  This is not to say that the Bureau collected $307 million 
for violations of TILA, because in most of these 18 cases, TILA claims 
accompanied alleged violations of other enumerated statutes or the 
Bureau’s UDAAP standard. 
Table 6. Public CFPB Enforcement of Selected Enumerated Consumer Financial Laws, 2012-2015 
Law 
Cases 
enforcing Cases against Consumer relief 
a CMPsa 
n % banks nonbanks $ x 1000 % $ x 1000 % 
TILA 18 14.8 4 14 306,901.2 2.7 22,616.0 5.8 
FCRA 14 11.5 4 10 375,130.2 3.3 65,835.0 17.0 
ECOA 8 6.6 6 2 493,250.0 4.4 30,900.0 8.0 
FDCPA 11 9.0 1 10 782,699.7 7.0 42,150.0 10.9 
EFTA 6 4.9 1 5 64,229.1 0.6 10,600.0 2.7 
RESPA 21 17.2 4 17 101,764.5 0.9 70,467.0 18.2 
aConsumer relief and civil money penalty figures reflect the total awards generated in cases that included 
each type of enumerated statutory claim. These total awards may be attributable in part to other claims 
asserted in each case. 
Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 2012-2015  
 Table 7 provides further information about the CFPB’s fair 
lending cases.  The Bureau has asserted ECOA claims 3 times in 
mortgage-related matters, 3 times in auto lending cases, and twice with 
respect to credit cards.  Although fair lending cases in the auto finance 
market have generated considerable controversy,128 these cases 
                                                 
 128. See Rachel Witkowski, CFPB Overestimates Potential Discrimination, Docu-
ments Show, AM. BANKER (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/law-
regulation/cfpb-overestimates-potential-discrimination-documents-show-1076742-1.html 
(citing internal CFPB documents that demonstrate “bias” in the agency’s discrimination-
detection methods). 
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represent only 2.5% of the Bureau’s public docket.  While the Bureau’s 
8 ECOA cases accounted for about  
6.6% of the Bureau’s publicly announced matters, the $493 million in 
consumer relief generated in these cases amounted to 4.4% of all 
consumer relief.  No defendant has contested a CFPB discrimination 
case after announcement.  And in every case in which the Bureau 
pleaded a violation of ECOA, it proceeded in collaboration with 
another law enforcement or regulatory agency. 
Table 7. Public CFPB Equal Credit Opportunity Act Cases, 2012-2015 
Financial 
product or 
Service 
Cases Contested cases 
Cases w/ enf. 
partner(s)  Consumer relief
a 
n % of all n 
% of 
ECOA n % of ECOA $ x 1000 % 
Mortgages 3 2.5 0 -- 3 37.5 71,250.0 0.6 
Credit cards 2 1.6 0 -- 2 25.0 300,000.0 2.7 
Auto 
financing 3 2.5 0 -- 3 37.5 122,000.0 1.1 
Total 8 6.6 0 -- 8 100.0 493,250.0 4.4 
aConsumer relief figures reflect the total awards generated in cases that included ECOA violations and 
can include relief attributable to other non-ECOA claims as well. 
Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 2012-2015  
 Much of the CFPB’s enforcement work has focused on stopping 
unfair, deceptive, or abusive financial acts and practices.  Table 8 
provides information on cases that pleaded claims either under 1 of 3 
regulations with unfairness- or deception-related provisions or under 
the CFPA’s general UDAAP standards.  The Bureau has used the 
FTC’s Telemarketing Sales Rule in 11 cases, which accounts for about 
9% of the Bureau’s public docket.  All but 1 of these cases were against 
nonbanks, and together they produced $712 million in consumer relief.  
Five of the Bureau’s 47 mortgage-lending-related cases asserted 
violations of the FTC’s Mortgage Advertising Practices Rule.  And the 
Bureau has only had 1 occasion to assert a violation of the FTC’s 
Credit Practices Rule. 
 Deception was by far the most common legal violation asserted 
in CFPB public enforcement actions to date.  Bureau examinations and 
investigations uncovered deceptive acts or practices leading to public 
enforcement matters in 73 of the Bureau’s 122 cases.  Although cases 
that asserted illegal deception accounted for nearly 60% of the 
Bureau’s public docket, these matters produced the overwhelming 
majority of financial relief for consumers.  Cases pleading deception 
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generated nearly $10.5 billion in consumer relief, which constituted 
about 93% of all consumer relief awarded in public Bureau actions. 
 There are interesting distinctions in the Bureau’s enforcement 
track record for the unfairness and abusiveness standards.  Cases that 
pleaded deception also generally pleaded unfairness, reflecting the 
simple reality that practices that deceive customers about material facts 
are often likely to satisfy the elements of unfairness claims as well.  
Conversely, the Bureau asserted abusiveness much more infrequently 
than deception or unfairness.  Only 14 cases included an abusiveness 
claim, representing about 11% of the Bureau’s public matters.  
Moreover, cases that did include abusiveness claims had much less at 
stake financially, insofar as these cases generated about $119 million 
in consumer relief—or about 1.1% of the Bureau’s overall consumer 
relief awards.  Cases alleging abusiveness generated a somewhat 
higher proportion of civil money penalties, but these cases still only 
accounted for about 4% of all penalties awarded. 
Table 8. Public CFPB Enforcement Actions Pleading Unfair-, Deceptive-, or Abusive-Practices 
Claims:  Rules and Standards, 2012-2015 
Law 
Cases 
enforcing Cases against Consumer relief
a CMPsa 
n % banks non-banks $ x 1000 % $ x 1000 % 
FTC UDAP 
Regulations         
Telemarketing 
Sales Rule 11 9.0 1 10 711,898.2 6.3 37,421.0 9.7 
Mortgage Advt. 
Practices Rule 5 4.1 0 5 14,892.2 0.1 6,573.0 1.7 
Credit Practices 
Rule 1 0.8 0 1 .0 0.0 .0 0.0 
UDAAP 
Standards         
Unfairness 47 38.5 12 35 10,176,456.4 90.6 210,688.0 54.4 
Deception 73 59.8 19 54 10,467,098.1 93.2 253,836.0 65.5 
Abusiveness 14 11.5 0 14 118,531.5 1.1 15,553.0 4.0 
aConsumer relief and civil money penalty figures reflect the total awards generated in cases that included 
UDAAP violations and can include relief attributable to other claims as well. 
Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 2012-2015  
 Table 9 synthesizes CFPB public enforcement data on settlement, 
individual liability, and use of the abusiveness standard to contrast 
public enforcement cases against banks and nonbanks.  Although 
CFPB cases against banks generated about 65% of all consumer relief 
and 63% of civil money penalties, the Bureau has individually charged 
a current bank employee in only 1 matter.  No bank has ever attempted 
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to contest a public CFPB enforcement action after announcement.  
And all 14 cases in which the Bureau alleged abusiveness were 
pursued against nonbanks. 
Table 9. Settlement, Individual Accountability, and Abusive Practices in CFPB Enforcement 
Actions Against Banks and Nonbanks, 2012-2015 
All 
cases 
Cases 
contested at 
filing 
Cases w/ 
indvd. charged 
“Abusiveness”  
charged 
n n % n % n % 
2012 
Banks 5 0 0.00 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Nonbanks 3 2 100.0 3 100.0 0 0.0 
Total 8 2 25.0 3 37.5 0 0.0 
2013 
Banks 9 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Nonbanks 18 6 100.0 8 100.0 2 100.0 
Total 27 6 22.2 8 29.6 2 7.4 
2014 
Banks 5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Nonbanks 27 11 100.0 12 100.0 4 100.0 
Total 32 11 34.4 12 37.5 4 12.5 
2015 
Banks 11 0 0.0 1 7.1 0 0.0 
Nonbanks 44 10 100.0 13 92.9 8 100.0 
Total 55 10 18.2 14 25.5 8 14.5 
Total 
Banks 30 0 0.0 1 2.7 0 0.0 
Nonbanks 92 29 100.0 36 97.3 14 100.0 
Total 122 29 23.8 37 30.3 14 11.5 
Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 2012-2015  
V. DISCUSSION:  SEVEN NOTEWORTHY FINDINGS ON THE CFPB’S 
LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CHALLENGES 
 Empirical analysis of public enforcement actions has the potential 
to help inform the ongoing debate over the CFPB’s accomplishments 
and challenges.  In particular, this Part sets out seven findings that may 
be noteworthy for policy makers, scholars, students, consumer 
advocates, the financial services industry, and CFPB staff. 
A. Finding 1:  During the Study Period, the CFPB’s Office of 
Enforcement Did Not Lose a Case 
 Critics of the CFPB have frequently argued that the Bureau is a 
“runaway agency”129 that “continually oversteps its bounds.”130  
However, this claim is in tension with the CFPB’s enforcement track 
record.  During the studied period, extending from the Bureau’s 
inception to December 31, 2015, the Bureau did not lose any of its 122 
publicly announced enforcement actions.  To be sure, the agency has 
lost a handful of motions, including a statute of limitations issue and a 
                                                 
 129. Hiltzik, supra note 17 (quoting Senator Cruz). 
 130. Ratcliffe, supra note 21. 
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venue dispute.131  And more recently—shortly before this Article went 
to press, but after the period of time studied—a federal district judge 
refused to enforce a Bureau civil investigative demand against a 
college accreditation agency that acts as a key student lending 
gatekeeper for for-profit colleges.132  Nonetheless, if the CFPB were 
continually overstepping its bounds, then perhaps critics of the agency 
ought to be able to point to many decisions of district court judges, 
administrative law judges, or U.S. courts of appeal dismissing the 
agency’s unlawful actions.  Yet, from its inception through 2015, the 
agency publicly announced 122 enforcement actions without losing a 
single case.  And after the study period, but prior to publication of this 
Article, the Bureau had lost only 1 precomplaint discovery dispute. 
 Nor is this track record diminished by the Bureau’s option of 
pursuing enforcement cases through administrative adjudication.  The 
CFPB has frequently used administrative enforcement actions to 
conclude matters in which the defendant has agreed to a settlement.  
But the Bureau has only very rarely used administrative adjudication in 
contested cases.  Out of 122 public enforcement cases, the Bureau has 
brought only 3 relatively small administrative enforcement actions that 
defendants contested after the Bureau filed notices of charges.133  
Although the Bureau’s administrative enforcement procedures are 
likely faster and less resource-intensive than pursuing disputed cases in 
federal court, the agency has refrained from attempting to exploit 
either a real or perceived “home court” advantage. 
 None of this is to say that the CFPB’s law enforcement efforts 
cannot improve.  All organizations must continually strive to develop 
and refine their work.  In many cases, reasonable minds can disagree 
about the meaning of the law, the nature of the business practices in 
question, or the appropriate process to follow.  It is therefore inevitable 
                                                 
 131. Although the CFPB has not prevailed on every claim or motion, as of December 
31, 2015, the Bureau had either reached a favorable settlement or was continuing to pursue 
contested matters in ongoing litigation.  See, e.g., CFPB v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:14-
cv-00292-SEB-TAB, 2015 WL 1013508 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 6, 2015) (denying the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss on the unfairness and abusiveness claims, but granting dismissal of the 
TILA claim as time-barred); CFPB v. CashCall, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-13167-GAO, 2015 WL 
5610813 (D. Mass. Sept. 23, 2015) (granting the defendant’s motion to transfer venue to the 
Central District of California). 
 132. See CFPB v. Accrediting Council for Indep. Colls. & Sch., No. 1:15-cv-01838-RJL 
(D.D.C. Apr. 21, 2016); see also Annie Waldman, Who’s Regulating For-Profit Schools?  
Execs from For-Profit Colleges, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 26, 2016, 5:55 AM), https:// 
www.propublica.org/article/whos-regulating-for-profit-schools-execs-from-for-profit-colleges 
(providing background on the role the Accrediting Council for Independent Colleges and 
Schools plays in facilitating for-profit school access to student loans). 
 133. See cases cited supra note 113. 
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that the CFPB will lose enforcement matters in the future.  Indeed, 
some might argue that an agency that does not lose cases may be 
neglecting important and challenging problems in areas where the law 
is uncertain.  Either way, all large, complex organizations make 
mistakes, and the CFPB will surely prove no exception.  Nevertheless, 
empirical analysis of the CFPB Office of Enforcement’s body of work 
reveals no credible evidence that the agency has approached its law 
enforcement responsibilities with anything other than professionalism 
and objectivity. 
B. Finding 2:  Over 90% of All Consumer Relief Was Awarded in 
Cases in Which the CFPB Uncovered Evidence that Defendants 
Illegally Deceived Consumers 
 Critics of the CFPB have suggested that the Bureau “dishes out 
malicious financial policy”134 and “quibble[s] about ‘hyper-
technicalities.’”135  However, the Bureau’s enforcement focus—as 
measured by dollars returned to the U.S. public—has overwhelmingly 
been upon companies that illegally deceived consumers.  In 73 out of 
122 cases, the Bureau alleged that the defendant engaged in a 
deceptive act or practice.  Deception was, by far, the most commonly 
pleaded claim in CFPB matters.  Cases including deceptive-practices 
claims generated over 93% of all relief provided to U.S. consumers:  
approximately $10.5 billion.  Far from a novel legal theory, the federal 
standard outlawing deceptive practices has been in effect since 1938136 
and has not substantively changed in any meaningful respect since the 
Reagan Administration.137  In every case alleging deception, the 
Bureau’s examiners or enforcement attorneys found evidence showing 
by a preponderance that the defendant misrepresented or omitted 
material facts in a way that would deceive consumers acting 
reasonably under the circumstances.  It is not malicious or 
                                                 
 134. Lane, supra note 19 (quoting Senator Perdue). 
 135. Derek Diaz, Are Rumors About the Death of the 10-Factor Test for Affiliated-
Business Arrangements Greatly Exaggerated?,  CLASS-ACTION & COMPLIANCE SENTINEL 
(June 7, 2015), http://www.realestateclassactions.com/2015/06/are-rumors-about-the-death-
of-the-10-factor-test-for-affiliated-business-arrangements-greatly-exaggerated-2/. 
 136. See Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, 111-14 (1938) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012)) (amending the FTCA to state that 
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared 
unlawful”). 
 137. See In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984) (including an 
appended deception policy statement revising the FTC’s deception test). 
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hypertechnical for the public to expect financial services companies to 
refrain from deceiving their customers. 
C. Finding 3:  Over 90% of All Consumer Relief Was Awarded in 
Cases in Which the CFPB Collaborated with Other State or 
Federal Law Enforcement Partners 
 Some have suggested that the CFPB is an “economic 
Frankenstein monster”138 that acts as “a rogue agency”139 with an 
“insular focus.”140  These claims are in tension with the Bureau’s track 
record of working collaboratively with other state, federal, and tribal 
law enforcement partners.  Cases in which the Bureau cited the 
cooperation of another law enforcement or regulatory agency 
generated almost 95% of all relief provided to U.S. consumers:  
approximately $10.7 billion.  Moreover, in every case in which the 
Bureau charged a defendant with illegal discrimination against a 
protected class of consumers, the Bureau proceeded in partnership 
with another law enforcement agency.141  In cases with the largest 
consumer relief awards, the Bureau was especially likely to proceed 
with some form of information sharing, joint pleading, or some other 
form of collaborative partnership.  The CFPB cited the cooperation of 
at least 1 state or federal law enforcement partner in 9 out of 11 cases 
with consumer relief awards in excess of $100 million.  Pursuing 
enforcement actions with multiple agencies in collaboration can be 
resource-intensive and subject to redundant management structures.  
But law enforcement partnerships can also provide an important check 
on the judgment and tactics of both agencies.  Empirical assessment of 
the Bureau’s track record reflects a consistent institutional commitment 
to investing enforcement resources in intergovernmental collaboration.  
Claims that the Bureau acts in a rogue capacity or with an insular focus 
should be carefully evaluated in light of the CFPB’s collaborative track 
record. 
                                                 
 138. Edward Woodson, Congress Created a Frankenstein Bureau, THEBLAZE (June 25, 
2015, 12:00 PM), http://www.theblaze.com/contributions/congress-created-a-frankenstein-
bureau/. 
 139. Lane, supra note 19 (quoting Senator Perdue). 
 140. Press Release, U.S. Representative Dennis A. Ross, Ross Uses Central Florida 
Example for Need To Reform Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (Feb. 27, 2014), http:// 
dennisross.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=371249. 
 141. See supra Table 7. 
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D. Finding 4:  No Bank Has Contested a Public CFPB Enforcement 
Action 
 Some have criticized the CFPB for using “intimidation tactics,”142 
which are “[s]ort of like showing up to a Sunday school picnic with a 
12 gauge shotgun,”143 in order to “bully banks.”144  Banks are 
understandably reluctant to risk the reputational harm and financial 
investment needed to litigate against the U.S. government.  However, 
in any civil enforcement action, a defendant has the option of 
presenting their defense to a judge.  While litigation can be costly, 
banks in general are well-funded and have access to excellent litigation 
counsel and public relations staff.  In particular, the banks that are 
subject to CFPB enforcement jurisdiction each have over $10 billion in 
assets—formidable reserves to draw upon in the face of alleged 
intimidation.  And yet through December of 2015, no bank has 
publicly contested a CFPB enforcement case.  This is not to say that 
the Bureau’s settlement negotiations have always gone smoothly nor 
that these settlements were produced without sharp differences of 
opinion.  Surely, at some point, a contested bank case is inevitable and 
will present the CFPB Office of Enforcement with a difficult litigation 
challenge.  Nevertheless, it is an empirically demonstrable fact that in 
its first 5 years, the Bureau was able to reach a negotiated settlement 
agreement with every bank subject to a public enforcement action.  
Arguably, an agency that does not at times bring defendants to trial 
may weaken its bargaining leverage as defendants discount the 
possibility of more costly sanctions.145  The fact that CFPB 
enforcement attorneys have reached negotiated compromises in every 
                                                 
 142. Katie Pavlich, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Grants Itself Authority To 
Shut Down Any Business at Anytime, TOWNHALL (June 19, 2014, 5:00 PM), http://townhall. 
com/tipsheet/katiepavlich/2014/06/19/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-grants-itself-
authority-to-shut-down-any-business-n1853590 (quoting the U.S. Consumer Coalition). 
 143. Dave Clarke, U.S. Consumer Cop Says Not Bullying Banks, REUTERS (Mar. 29, 
2012, 4:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/financial-regulation-cfpb-idUSL2E8ET 
7XL20120329 (quoting the head of a lobbying group as stating that the CFPB practice of 
assigning enforcement attorneys to supervisory exams is “sort of like showing up to a Sunday 
school picnic with a 12 gauge shotgun”). 
 144. Newt Gingrich, CFPB Is No ‘Start-Up’ Agency, It’s the Same Old Bureaucracy 
and Should Be Repealed, DAILY CALLER (Sept. 17, 2014, 3:55 PM), http://dailycaller.com/ 
2014/09/17/cfpb-is-no-start-up-agency-its-the-same-old-bureaucracy-and-should-be-repealed/. 
 145. See Wall Street Reform:  Oversight of Financial Stability and Consumer and 
Investor Protections:  Hearing on Examining the Agencies’ Overall Implementation of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act Before the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 29 (2013) (statement of Sen. Elizabeth 
Warren, Member, S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs). 
 
 
 
 
1098 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1057 
 
public enforcement action against a bank suggests that Bureau staff 
have approached their work from a posture of reasonable compromise. 
E. Finding 5:  The CFPB Has Demonstrated the Willingness and 
Ability To Hold Senior Managers at Nonbank Financial 
Companies Individually Liable for Their Illegal Acts 
 A key lesson of the financial crisis was that regulatory and 
enforcement systems broke down, in part, because they allowed 
individual employee compensation systems “designed in an 
environment of cheap money, intense competition, and light 
regulation” that “too often rewarded the quick deal, the short-term 
gain—without proper consideration of long-term consequences.”146  
This lack of individual accountability for reckless financial practices 
“encouraged the big bet—where the payoff on the upside could be 
huge and the downside limited,” from the perspective of individual 
financiers.147  Taking this lesson to heart, Director Cordray has 
explained:  “I’ve always felt strongly that you can’t only go after 
companies.  Companies run through individuals, and individuals need 
to know that they’re at risk when they do bad things under the umbrella 
of a company.”148  In keeping with this purpose, the Bureau’s 
enforcement track record shows that the agency has consistently 
charged individuals with illegal activity in 25% to 37% of public cases 
each year.149  Overall, 30.3% of CFPB enforcement actions charged 
individuals with illegal activity. 
 However, nearly all of the Bureau’s cases that charged individuals 
with illegal activity were brought against nonbanks.  The Bureau has 
charged current bank employees in only 1 RESPA matter, in which 
bank loan officers accepted pay-to-play kickbacks from a title 
insurance company in exchange for mortgage lending referrals.150  
With the exception of RESPA, in most cases in which the Bureau 
charged one or more individual defendants, the CFPB relied on the 
CFPA’s interrelated definitions of a “covered person” and a “related 
                                                 
 146. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 2, at xix. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Emily Stephenson, U.S. Consumer Watchdog Says Committed to Stiff Penalties, 
REUTERS (Oct. 23, 2013, 7:19 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-washington-summit-
cordray-idUSBRE99M1K520131023 (quoting Cordray). 
 149. See supra Table 9. 
 150. See Press Release, CFPB, CFPB and State of Maryland Take Action Against 
“Pay-To-Play” Mortgage Kickback Scheme (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.consumerfinance. 
gov/newsroom/cfpb-and-state-of-maryland-take-action-against-pay-to-play-mortgage-kickback-
scheme/. 
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person.”  The definition of “covered persons,” which generally 
includes any company “that engages in offering or providing a 
consumer financial product or service,” is the most basic provision 
defining the scope of the Bureau’s enforcement authority.151  For 
nonbanks, “related persons,” which include “any director, officer, or 
employee charged with managerial responsibility,” are subject to the 
same liability and standards of proof as “covered persons.”152  But 
Dodd-Frank carves bank employees out of the definition of “related 
persons,” leaving the burden of proof for bank employees less 
certain.153  Without the benefit of the “related person” definition, the 
Bureau would likely need to plead individual UDAAP-liability claims 
against bank employees under 12 U.S.C. § 5536(a)(3), which requires 
proof that the employee “knowingly or recklessly provide[d] 
substantial assistance” to a “covered person.”154  Through 2015, the 
Bureau has not imposed liability on a bank employee by demonstrating 
the added mens rea requirements for substantial-assistance liability.  
Thus, although the Bureau has demonstrated a commitment to holding 
individuals liable for their companies’ illegal practices, the CFPB 
continues to face challenges in holding individual bankers responsible 
for unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices. 
F. Finding 6:  The CFPB Has Proceeded Cautiously in Enforcing 
the Consumer Financial Protection Act’s New “Abusiveness” 
Standard  
 Perhaps no substantive legal issue has engendered more concern 
from the financial services industry than the CFPB’s legal authority to 
prohibit “abusive” acts or practices.  Some financial services lawyers 
have urged the Bureau to use a notice-and-comment rulemaking to 
define the universe of potential abusive activities.  Others have gone 
further, calling the abusiveness standard “dangerous”155 and asserting 
that the agency’s approach “likely is not sustainable”156 and is 
                                                 
 151. 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6) (2012). 
 152. Id. § 5481(25). 
 153. See id. 
 154. Id. § 5536(a)(3). 
 155. Zywicki, supra note 65, at 919. 
 156. Benjamin Saul, Kyle Tayman & Andrew Kim, CFPB Must Show Its Cards on 
Defining ‘Abusive,’ AM. BANKER (Nov. 6, 2015), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/ 
cfpb-must-show-its-cards-on-defining-abusive-1077707-1.html. 
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“reckless.”157  However, these allegations are in tension with several 
facts that emerge through empirical analysis of all CFPB enforcement 
matters.  Overall, CFPB cases alleging abusive practices have 
comprised a relatively small proportion of the Bureau’s public docket 
as measured by the number of cases (11.5%), civil money penalties 
(about 4%), and especially total consumer relief awarded (about 1%).158 
 Moreover, the CFPB has exercised procedural and substantive 
restraint in developing the abusiveness doctrine through its administra-
tive enforcement actions.  For instance, the Bureau has never asserted 
an abusiveness claim in a contested administrative proceeding.  Indeed, 
the Bureau has only charged defendants with abusive acts or practices 
in 3 administrative enforcement actions, all of which merely used 
administrative enforcement to enter negotiated consent orders settling 
the Bureau’s claims by agreement.159  And although many financial 
services industry lawyers have bemoaned the uncertainty of the 
abusiveness standard, it is notable that every CFPB abusiveness claim 
through 2015 accompanied a traditional deception claim, an unfairness 
claim, or both. 
 Nevertheless, the strength of the abusive-practices standard lies in 
the ability of the Bureau to flexibly adapt it to new and emerging 
methods of taking unreasonable advantage of consumers.  Nothing in 
the CFPA requires the Bureau to commit this consumer protection tool 
to an inflexible—and easily evaded—list of particularly enumerated 
financial practices that will grow stale with time and technological 
change.  Claims that the CFPB is a “schoolyard bully that singles out 
the quiet kid hanging out by the tire swing”160 seem overwrought when 
the Bureau has never charged a single bank with any abusive act or 
practice in a public enforcement action.  The Bureau’s actual track 
record in developing the new abusive-practices standard has been 
cautiously incremental, focused on peripheral companies with highly 
offensive practices, oriented toward protecting vulnerable consumers, 
largely concomitant with traditional deception or unfairness claims, 
                                                 
 157. Phil Hall, U.S. Chamber of Commerce:  CFPB “Failed,” NAT’L MORTGAGE PROF. 
MAG. (June 11, 2015, 3:35 PM), http://nationalmortgageprofessional.com/news/54469/us-
chamber-commerce-cfpb-failed. 
 158. See supra Table 8. 
 159. In all 3 cases, the defendant agreed to the settlement, and each case was 
announced with a consent order.  See In re Fort Knox Nat’l Co., CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0008 
(Apr. 20, 2015); In re Colfax Capital Corp., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0009 (July 25, 2014); In 
re ACE Cash Express, Inc., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0008 (July 8, 2014). 
 160. Jason Kratovil, The School Yard Bully, FIN. SERVICES ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 8, 
2014), http://fsroundtable.org/school-yard-bully-cfpb/.  Jason Kratovil is the Vice President of 
Government Affairs for the Financial Services Roundtable.  Id. 
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and entirely advanced through either negotiated settlements or under 
the adjudication of federal judges. 
G. Finding 7:  In 2015 Public Enforcement Cases, CFPB Law 
Enforcement Staff Generated Approximately $9.3 Million per 
Employee in Refunds, Redress, and Forgiven Debts for American 
Consumers 
 Critics of the CFPB have often complained that the agency is just 
another “vast bureaucracy”161 with “bloated, overpaid”162 employees 
who have “an abysmal track record in obtaining financial relief for 
consumers.”163  However, empirically grounded analysis of the Bureau 
and its work is in tension with these claims.  While the term “vast” is 
subject to some interpretation, as a factual matter, the CFPB’s SEFL 
division has approximately 687 employees—a smaller group than the 
average U.S. high school.164  In contrast, JPMorgan Chase Bank, the 
largest bank subject to CFPB supervision and enforcement, has an 
estimated 240,000 employees working in 5,511 domestic branches.165  
Although the CFPB and the large banks it regulates are not 
comparable in size, JPMorgan Chase Bank and CFPB employees are 
similar in one respect:  both workforces make roughly the same 
average annual salary.166  On average, CFPB employees make 
“somewhat less than a third-year investment banking analyst.”167 
                                                 
 161. Jacobson, supra note 18 (quoting Fiorina). 
 162. Robert Feinberg, House Subcommittee Argues over CFPB Budget, NEWSMAX 
(June 24, 2013, 2:28 PM), http://www.newsmax.com/t/finance/article/511572. 
 163. Press Release, Lemberg Law, CFPB Ineffective in Obtaining Financial Relief for 
Victims of Debt Collection Violations (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.streetinsider.com/Press+ 
Releases/CFPB+Ineffective+in+Obtaining+Financial+Relief+for+Victims+of+Debt+Collecti
on+Violations/10477972.html. 
 164. The Department of Education reports that the average U.S. high school has 854 
students.  Table 5.  Average Student Membership Size of Regular Public Elementary and 
Secondary Schools with Membership, by Instructional Level, Membership Size of Largest 
and Smallest School, and State or Jurisdiction:  School Year 2009-10, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. 
STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/pesschools09/tables/table_05.asp (last visited May 9, 
2016). 
 165. About Us, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/ 
About-JPMC/about-us.htm (last visited May 9, 2016); Insured U.S.-Chartered Commercial 
Banks that Have Consolidated Assets of $300 Million or More, Ranked by Consolidated 
Assets, FED. RES. (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/lbr/20151231/lrg_ 
bnk_lst.pdf. 
 166. See Matt Levine, Are Bank Regulators Overpaid?, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Apr. 22, 
2014, 10:53 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-04-22/are-bank-regulators-
overpaid. 
 167. Id.; see also Kenneth Rapoza, How Much Do Wall Streeters Really Earn?, 
FORBES (Mar. 13, 2013, 1:47 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2013/03/13/how-
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 Moreover, in every year of the CFPB’s operations, the Bureau 
spent far less than the total funding caps authorized by Congress.168  
Similar to other banking regulators, the CFPB’s budget is not drawn 
directly from taxpayer funds.  Instead, Dodd-Frank authorizes the 
CFPB to draw funds from the Federal Reserve up to a preset funding 
cap.  On a quarterly basis, the Bureau sends a transfer request to the 
Federal Reserve, and on the basis of that request, the Federal Reserve 
transfers funds to the Bureau.  Congress set the Bureau’s current 
funding cap at 12% of the total operating expenses of the Federal 
Reserve System.169  If the Bureau does not transfer all the funds 
available to it under the funding cap, the surplus funds remain with the 
Federal Reserve and, ordinarily, are eventually transferred to the 
Treasury.170  Figure 5 illustrates the CFPB’s use of its available funding.  
Although there are important distinctions between congressional and 
CFPB spending, it nonetheless bears mentioning that unlike 
Congress—which has incurred budget deficits from time to time—the 
CFPB has operated with a surplus, based on its available funding cap, 
in every year of operation. 
                                                                                                             
much-do-wall-streeters-really-earn/#4c52f4d17f08 (listing the average pay for a Wall Street 
investment analyst). 
 168. See Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau:  Fiscal Year 
2015, supra note 108, at 115; Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau:  
Fiscal Year 2014, supra note 110, at 103; Financial Report of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau:  Fiscal Year 2013, CFPB 36 (2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/ 
f/201312_cfpb_report_financial-report.pdf. 
 169. Congress set the CFPB’s funding cap at 10% of the Federal Reserve System’s 
operating expenses in fiscal year 2011, 11% of these expenses in fiscal year 2012, and 12% 
per year thereafter, subject to annual adjustments for inflation.  See Victoria McGrane, 
Consumer Bureau Gets Its Money from NY Fed Account, WALL STREET J.:  REAL TIME ECON. 
(Feb. 15, 2012, 12:03 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2012/02/15/consumer-bureau-
gets-its-money-from-ny-fed-account/?mod=WSJBlog. 
 170. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Reserve, Federal Reserve Board Announces 
Reserve Bank Income and Expense Data and Transfers to the Treasury for 2015 (Jan. 11, 
2016), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20160111a.htm (announcing 
payments of $97.7 billion net income to the Treasury).  Although the Federal Reserve is 
required to transfer a majority of its profits to the Treasury, the Federal Reserve also funds its 
own operating expenses as well as the Bureau’s operations. 
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 Last year, although the Bureau’s funding cap increased by $11 
million, the CFPB elected to draw $49 million less from Federal 
Reserve funds.  Nevertheless, the CFPB’s estimated 687 SEFL 
employees generated substantial refunds, redress, and forgiven debts 
for U.S. consumers.  As illustrated in Figure 2 supra, the CFPB 
generated $6.4 billion in consumer relief last year.  This amounts to 
about $9.3 million in relief provided to U.S. consumers per CFPB law 
enforcement employee.  Put another way, every dollar spent last year 
paying CFPB SEFL employees produced a fifty-threefold return in 
consumer relief from illegal financial practices for U.S. consumers.171  
Counting only those cases in which the defendant illegally deceived 
consumers, Bureau law enforcement staff generated an estimated 
$8,960,400 in consumer relief per employee last year.  Thus, speaking 
colloquially, for every dollar spent on CFPB law enforcement staff last 
year, the U.S. government forced banks and other financial companies 
to repay or forgive over $50 for deceiving American consumers.172 
                                                 
 171. The Bureau’s 2015 fiscal report estimates $266 million in total expenditures on 
salary and benefits for all CFPB staff.  See Financial Report of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau:  Fiscal Year 2015, supra note 108, at 63.  SEFL employees comprise 45% 
of the Bureau’s 1529 reported employees.  Id. at 13.  Assuming SEFL employees have 
roughly the same compensation and benefits costs as other CFPB staff, the SEFL division 
incurred an estimated $119,700,000 in employee costs.  This estimated per-employee return 
does not include other nonpay expenses such as facilities or contract support services. 
 172. Those public CFPB enforcement actions alleging deceptive acts or practices, 
concluding in 2015, generated approximately $6.1 billion in total consumer relief.  This 
estimated per-employee return does not include other nonpay expenses such as facilities or 
contract support services. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 Congress created the CFPB to help heal the scars left by the 
Great Recession and to prevent similar harm to Americans in the 
future.  This Article presents an empirical analysis of the Bureau’s law 
enforcement track record in pursuing this mission.  Drawing upon 
pleadings, consent orders, settlement agreements, press releases, and 
other publicly available documents, this study classified every public 
enforcement action announced through 2015 based on over 70 
variables.  The data reported in this Article should serve as an 
analytical benchmark against which future Bureau action can be 
measured and as a needle to deflate the absurdly overheated political 
rhetoric used to grandstand against the CFPB’s mission and 
accomplishments.  Vapid allegations that the new consumer protection 
agency is a “Frankenstein monster,”173 based on “the Stalin model,”174 
or taking the first steps toward “socialism”175 are thoughtlessly 
untethered from reality.  While the quantitative nature of this analysis 
leaves much room for additional research and discussion, this study 
suggests that the CFPB has built an effective and professional law 
enforcement staff. 
 Among other results, this study includes the following findings:  
(1) in 122 matters that generated over $11 billion in consumer redress 
and forgiven debts, the CFPB did not lose a case from its inception 
through 2015; (2) over 90% of all consumer relief was awarded in 
CFPB cases in which the defendants illegally deceived consumers; 
(3) over 90% of all consumer relief was awarded in cases in which the 
CFPB collaborated with other state, tribal, or federal law enforcement 
partners; (4) no bank has publicly contested a public CFPB 
enforcement action; (5) the CFPB has demonstrated the willingness 
and ability to hold senior managers at nonbank financial companies 
individually liable for illegal acts; (6) the CFPB has proceeded 
cautiously in enforcing the CFPA’s new “abusive” acts and practices 
standard; and (7) in public cases challenging illegal financial practices, 
concluding last year, CFPB SEFL staff generated approximately $9.3 
million per employee in refunds, redress, and forgiven debts for U.S. 
consumers. 
 Nevertheless, like all organizations, the CFPB’s law enforcement 
program will continue to face ongoing challenges.  For example, to 
                                                 
 173. Woodson, supra note 138. 
 174. Lardner, supra note 22 (quoting Representative Duffy). 
 175. Jacobson, supra note 18 (quoting Fiorina). 
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date, the CFPB has not announced any public enforcement actions in 
the pawnshop industry or against international remittance providers 
and has had relatively modest success in the market for payday loans—
all industries that profoundly affect the financial lives of lower-income 
Americans.  Although the Bureau has effectively pursued individual 
liability in nonbank matters, the CFPB continues to face challenges in 
holding individual bank employees accountable for illegal activity.  
Moreover, the Bureau also faces a challenge in plotting a useful 
trajectory for the new statutory prohibition of abusive acts and 
practices.  While the Bureau has understandably proceeded with 
caution, Congress adopted this potentially innovative law in 
recognition of the terrible suffering of Americans caused by defective 
financial products during the Great Recession.  Deploying our national 
prohibition of abusive finance to serve the public welfare should 
remain a top supervisory and enforcement priority for the CFPB.  
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APPENDIX:  PUBLIC CFPB ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS:  
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST, 2011-2015 
1. In re Capital One Bank, (USA) N.A., CFPB No. 2012-CFPB-0001 (July 17, 
2012), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201207_cfpb_consent_order_0001.pdf. 
2. In re Discover Bank, CFPB No. 2012-CFPB-0005 (Sept. 24, 2012), http:// 
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201209_cfpb_consent_order_0005.pdf. 
3. In re Am. Express Centurion Bank, CFPB No. 2012-CFPB-0002 (Oct. 1, 
2012), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2012-CFPB-0002-American-Express- 
Centurion-Consent-Order.pdf. 
4. In re Am. Express Bank, FSB, CFPB No. 2012-CFPB-0003 (Oct. 1, 2012), http:// 
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_cfpb_001_Amex_Express_Bank_Cons
ent_Order.pdf. 
5. In re Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., CFPB No. 2012-CFPB-0004 
(Oct. 1, 2012), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_cfpb_001_Amex_ 
Express_Travel_Consent_Order.pdf. 
6. CFPB v. Jalan, No. SACV12-02088 AG (ANx) (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201212_cfpb_nlhc-tro.pdf. 
7. CFPB v. Payday Loan Debt Sol., Inc., No. 1:12-cv-24410-JEM (S.D. Fla. 
Dec. 20, 2012), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201212_cfpb_plds-final-
judgment.pdf. 
8. CFPB v. Gordon, No. 2:12-cv-06147-RSWL-MRW (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2013), 
http://www.cfpbconsumerprotection-gordon.org/Content/Documents/Stipulated 
%20Final%20Judgment.pdf. 
9. CFPB v. Mortg. Guar. Ins. Corp., No. 1:13-cv-21187-DLG (S.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 
2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201304_cfpb_Doc5_MGIC-Final-
Order.pdf. 
10. CFPB v. Genworth Mortg. Ins. Corp., No. 1:13-cv-21183-JLK (S.D. Fla. Apr. 
5, 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201304_cfpb_Doc5_Genworth- 
Final-Order.pdf. 
11. CFPB v. United Guar. Corp., No. 1:13-cv-21189-KMW (S.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 
2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201304_cfpb_Doc5_UGI-Final-Order. 
pdf. 
12. CFPB v. Radian Guar. Inc., No. 1:13-cv-21188-JAL (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2013), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201304_cfpb_Doc5_Radian-Final-Order.pdf. 
13. In re Taylor, CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0001 (May 17, 2013), http://files. 
consumerfinance.gov/f/291305_cfpb_consent-order-0001.pdf. 
14. CFPB v. Am. Debt Settlement Sols., Inc., No. 9:13-cv-80548-DMM (S.D. 
Fla. June 6, 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb_final 
order_adss_signed-judgment.pdf. 
15. In re Dealers’ Fin. Servs., LLC, CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0004 (June 25, 
2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb_consent-order-004.pdf. 
16. CFPB v. Morgan Drexen, Inc., No. SACV13-01267 JST (JEMx) (C.D. Cal. 
filed Aug. 20, 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201308_cfpb_ 
complaint_morgan-drexen.pdf. 
17. In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0007 (Sept. 18, 
2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201309_cfpb_jpmc_consent-order.pdf. 
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18. CFPB v. Meracord LLC, No. 3:13-cv-05871-RBL (W.D. Wash. Oct. 4, 
2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201310_cfpb_meracord-proposed-
stipulated-final-judgment-and-consent-order.pdf. 
19. In re Wash. Fed., CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0005 (Oct. 9, 2013), http://files. 
consumerfinance.gov/f/201310_cfpb_consent-order_washington-federal.pdf. 
20. In re Mortg. Master, Inc., CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0006 (Oct. 9, 2013), http:// 
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201310_cfpb_consent-order_mortgage-master.pdf. 
21. CFPB v. Borders & Borders, PLC, No. 3:13-mc-99999 (W.D. Ky. filed Oct. 
24, 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201310_cfpb_complaint_borders. 
pdf. 
22. CFPB v. Castle & Cooke Mortg., LLC, No. 2:13-cv-00684-DAK (D. Utah 
Nov. 12, 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201311_cfpb_final-order_ 
castle-cooke.pdf. 
23. CFPB v. Republic Mortg. Ins. Co., No. 1:13-cv-24146-JAL (S.D. Fla. Nov. 
19, 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201311_cfpb_consent-order_RMIC.pdf. 
24. In re Cash Am. Int’l, Inc., CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0008 (Nov. 20, 2013), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2013-cfpb_0008_consent-order.pdf. 
25. In re 3D Resorts-Bluegrass, LLC, CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0002 (Dec. 2, 2013), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb_consent-order_3dresorts-blue 
grass.pdf. 
26. In re GE Capital Retail Bank, CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0009 (Dec. 10, 2013), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb_consent-order_0009.pdf. 
27. CFPB v. CashCall, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-13167-GAO (D. Mass. filed Dec. 16, 2013), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb_complaint_cashcall.pdf. 
28. In re Ally Fin. Inc., CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0010 (Dec. 19, 2013), http://files. 
consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb_consent-order_ally.pdf. 
29. In re Am. Express Centurion Bank, CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0011 (Dec. 24, 
2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb_consent_amex_centuri 
on_011.pdf. 
30. In re Am. Express Bank, FSB, CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0012 (Dec. 24, 2013), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb_consent_amex_FSB_012.pdf. 
31. In re Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0013 (Dec. 
24, 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_CFPB_Consent_AETRS_ 
013.pdf. 
32. CFPB v. Nat’l City Bank, No. 2:13-cv-01817-CB (W.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2014), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb_consent_national-city-bank.pdf. 
33. In re Fid. Mortg. Corp., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0001 (Jan. 15, 2014), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201401_cfpb_consent-order_fidelity.pdf. 
34. In re PHH Corp., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0002 (filed Jan. 29, 2014), http:// 
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201402_cfpb_0002_notice-of-charges.pdf. 
35. In re 1st All. Lending, LLC, CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0003 (Feb. 24, 2014), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201402_cfpb_consent-order_first-alliance.pdf. 
36. CFPB v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 1:13-cv-02025-RMC (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2014), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201403_cfpb_entered-judgment-with-
exhibits_ocwen.pdf. 
37. CFPB v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-00292-SEB-TAB (S.D. Ind. filed 
Feb. 26, 2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201402_cfpb_complaint_ITT. 
pdf. 
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38. In re Bank of Am., N.A., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0004 (Apr. 7, 2014), http://files. 
consumerfinance.gov/f/201404_cfpb_bankofamerica_consent-order.pdf. 
39. In re JRHBW Realty, Inc., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0005 (May 24, 2014), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201405_cfpb_consent-order_realty-south-and-
title-south.pdf. 
40. In re Stonebridge Title Servs., Inc., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0006 (June 12, 2014), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201406_cfpb_consent-order_stonebridge-title-
services.pdf. 
41. In re Synchrony Bank, CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0007 (June 19, 2014), http://files. 
consumerfinance.gov/f/201406_cfpb_consent-order_synchrony-bank.pdf. 
42. In re ACE Cash Express, Inc., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0008 (July 8, 2014), http:// 
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201407_cfpb_consent-order_ace-cash-express.pdf. 
43. CFPB v. Frederick J. Hanna & Assocs., P.C., No. 1:14-cv-02211-AT-WEJ (N.D. 
Ga. filed July 14, 2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201407_cfpb_ 
complaint_hanna.pdf. 
44. CFPB v. Siringoringo, No. 2:14-cv-05681 (C.D. Cal. filed July 22, 2014), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201407_cfpb_complaint_clausen-cobb.pdf. 
45. CFPB v. Mortg. Law Grp., LLP, No. 3:14-cv-00513 (W.D. Wis. filed July 22, 
2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201407_cfpb_complaint_cfpb-v-tmlg-
et-al.pdf. 
46. In re Colfax Capital Corp., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0009 (July 25, 2014), http:// 
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201407_cfpb_consent-order_rome-finance.pdf. 
47. In re Amerisave Mortg. Corp., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0010 (Aug. 12, 2014), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201408_cfpb_consent-order_amerisave.pdf. 
48. In re USA Discounters, Ltd., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0011 (Aug. 13, 2014), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201408_cfpb_consent-order_usa-discounters. 
pdf. 
49. In re First Inv’rs Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0012 (Aug. 19, 
2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201408_cfpb_consent-order_first-inves 
tors.pdf. 
50. CFPB v. Glob. Client Sols., LLC, No. 2:14-cv-06643-DDP-JPR (C.D. Cal. Aug. 
27, 2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201408_cfpb_consent-order_global- 
client-solutions.pdf. 
51. CFPB v. Moseley, No. 4:14-cv-00789-DW (W.D. Mo. filed Sept. 8, 2014), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201409_cfpb_complaint_hydra-group.pdf. 
52. CFPB v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-07194 (N.D. Ill. filed Sept. 16, 
2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201409_cfpb_complaint_corinthian.pdf. 
53. In re U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0013 (Sept. 24, 2014), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201409_cfpb_consent-order_us-bank.pdf. 
54. In re Lighthouse Title, Inc., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0015 (Sept. 25, 2014), http:// 
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201409_cfpb_consent-order_lighthouse-title.pdf. 
55. In re Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0014 (Sept. 29, 2014), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201409_cfpb_consent-order_flagstar.pdf. 
56. United States v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-01028-RMC (D.D.C. Sept. 
30, 2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201406_cfpb_consent-judgement_ 
sun-trust.pdf. 
57. In re Mfrs. & Traders Tr. Co., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0016 (Oct. 9, 2014), 
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